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I. INTRODUCTION
The General Utilities doctrine is the name given to the now largely defunct
tax rule that a corporation does not recognize a gain or a loss on making a
liquidating or nonliquidating distribution of an appreciated or depreciated asset
• Paul G. Kauper Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1955,
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to its shareholders.' The roots of the doctrine, can be traced to a regulation
promulgated in 1919 that denied realization of gain or loss to a corporation
when making a liquidating distribution of an asset in kind. 2 No regulatory
provision existed which specified the extent to which realization would or would
not be triggered by a nonliquidating distribution such as a dividend or a stock
redemption. In General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,a the Supreme
Court adopted a nonrecognition rule for dividend distributions that are made
in kind.4 In deference to that decision, the rule for nonrecognition of gain or
loss on a liquidating or a nonliquidating corporate distribution of property in
kind has been commonly referred to as the General Utilities doctrine. Congress
codified the doctrine in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the Code).' With
few exceptions, the original provisions of the Code provided that a distributing
corporation did not recognize a gain or loss on making a distribution in kind.
Over the years, Congress adopted numerous exceptions to the general rule
of nonrecognition of gain so that even before the Tax Reform Act of 19866
(TRA 1986) was adopted, recognition of gain had become the general rule and
nonrecognition the exception for nonliquidating distributions. To a lesser extent,
the General Utilities doctrine was worn away with respect to liquidating distri-
butions as well. For example, both the depreciation recapture rules and LIFO
recapture rules triggered recognition in liquidating or nonliquidating corporate
distributions. 7 With respect to nonliquidating distributions, by 1986 the general
rule had become that a corporation recognized a gain on making a distribution
of an appreciated asset (for example, as a dividend, a stock redemption, or a
partial liquidation), and only in narrowly defined circumstances was gain not
recognized." The General Utilities doctrine had been sufficiently eroded by 1986
that it was said that the "General" had been reduced in rank to a "Corporal." 9
Subject to transitional rules and delayed effective dates for certain small
corporations, under the amendments in TRA 1986, Congress requires recognition
of gain for all corporate distributions of appreciated property,10 but provides
nonrecognition of gain or loss for: 1) Certain distributions made in liquidation
1. D. KAHN & P. GAN, CORPORATE TAXATION AND TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
147 (2d ed. 1985).
2. Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 547 (1919) provided: "No gain or loss is realized by a corporation
from the mere distribution of its assets in kind upon dissolution, however they may have appreciated
or depreciated in value since their acquisition."
3. 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
4. Id. at 204.
5. Sections 311, 336, and 337 of the Code were the principal provisions that dealt with the
General Utilities doctrine. Congress repudiated most of the doctrine in 1986 when it amended those
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. See infra text accompanying notes 10-17.
6. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(100 Stat.) 4075 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (hereinafter TRA 1986].
7. I.R.C. §§ 31 l(b), 336(b), 337(f), 1245, 1250 (1986) (noting the Code as it existed immediately
prior to the adoption of TRA 1986).
8. Id. § 311(d).
9. Oral conversation between Terrence G. Perris, Esquire and the author.
10. No gain is recognized by a corporation on distributing its own stock or its own debt
instrument. Under § 1032 of the Code, a corporation does not recognize a gain or loss on the
disposition of its own stock. I.R.C. § 1032 (1986). Neither does a corporation recognize a gain or
loss or, the sale or exchange of its own debt instrument for the face amount because that transaction
is essentially one in which the corporation is borrowing funds and the distributee is merely a lender.
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of a corporate subsidiary;" and 2) for distributions made pursuant to a corporate
division or reorganization. 2 The post-TRA 1986 Code continues to preclude the
recognition of losses on a nonliquidating corporate distribution of a depreciated
asset. With a few exceptions, losses are recognized on a corporation's liquidating
distributions. 3 Thus, Congress has retained the General Utilities doctrine for
losses-at least as to nonliquidating distributions-but it has revoked the doctrine
for gains.
TRA 1986 eliminated virtually all of the General Utilities doctrine that
applies to the recognition of gain. The question now becomes whether the
doctrine should have been retained or even expanded. The justifications behind
the General Utilities doctrine and the reasons for its demise are worth examining
because the battle over this doctrine may not be over. When the hearings in
Congress were held to consider the repeal of General Utilities, a number of
witnesses testified that the doctrine should be retained for liquidating distributions
of small, closely-held corporations, at least with respect to the distributions of
capital and section 1231 assets.' 4 When, in TRA 1986, Congress required a
corporation to recognize gain or loss on making a liquidating distribution of
appreciated or depreciated property, it delayed the effective date of that provision
for the liquidation of certain small, closely-held corporations that liquidate before
1989.11 This delayed effective date is available only to corporations that were:
1) in existence on August 1, 1986; and 2) from that date until liquidated had
more than fifty percent (by value) of its stock held by ten or fewer "qualified
11. I.R.C. §§ 332, 336, 337 (1987).
12. Id. §§ 361, 368, 1032. The exceptions for reorganizations, corporate divisions, and
liquidations of controlled subsidiaries are nonrecognition provisions (as contrasted to nonrealization)
and, therefore, provision is made for carryover basis with regard to such transactions. Id.
§§ 334(b)(1), 362; D. KAH & P. GANN, supra note 1, at 542. However, if the corporation issues
its debt instrument at a discount, then it can enjoy deductions under the original issue discount
rules over the term of the loan; and, conversely, if the debt is issued at a premium, the corporation
will recognize income over the term of the loan; and, conversely, if the debt is issued at a premium,
the corporation will recognize income over the term of the loan. See B. BIrrTKER & J. EuSTICE,
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 4.40-.60 (5th ed. 1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
12(c). The deduction of income provided for debt issued at a discount or at a premium is a means
of adjusting the interest deductible by the issuer and recognizable by the creditor to reflect the
actual interest paid.
13. I.R.C. §§ 311(a) & 336(a) (1987).
14. Reform of Corporate Taxation: Hearing on S.556 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1983) (testimony of John S. Nolan); Staff Recommendations to Revise
Subchapter C: Hearings on S.506 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1985) (testimony of Edwin S. Cohen); STAFF
OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION
ACT OF 1985 6-7 (Comm. Print 1985); see Nolan, Taxing Corporate Distributions of Appreciated
Property: Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine and Relief Measures, 22 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 97,
99-104 (1985).
15. TRA 1986, supra note 6, § 633(d). This exception does not apply to a corporation whose
value exceeds $10,000,000. TRA 1986 also requires that the amount of the nonrecognition provided
by that provision be phased out when the value of the corporation exceeds $5,000,000. Id. The
delayed effective date also applies to certain other 1986 amendments that relate to corporate
liquidations. For example, the delayed date also applies to prevent a liquidating corporation from
recognizing a gain or loss on the sale of certain types of assets pursuant to a liquidation that is
completed within a twelve-month period.
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persons. '1' 6 The delayed effective date provision of TRA 1986 neither prevents
a liquidating corporation from recognizing ordinary gain or loss from the dis-
tribution of an asset; nor does it prevent the recognition of short-term gain or
lOSS.17
The concern over the application of a recognition requirement to a liquidating
small corporation is likely to inspire further debate about whether the General
Utilities doctrine or some modified version of that doctrine should be reinstated,
especially for small corporations. Perhaps, the delayed effective date provision
will be extended by Congress to apply after 1988, but, even if that is done,
eventually Congress will have to face the question of whether the repeal of
General Utilities was wise. A continuing discussion of the problem will keep it
alive and may help Congress decide whether to bring back the doctrine or to
fashion relief measures for some of the consequences of the 1986 repeal. It is
noteworthy that in its current study of proposals for change to Subchapter C
of the Code, the Treasury Department is contemplating proposing changes to
the treatment of the General Utilities issue.18
Also, the General Utilities doctrine has not been completely eliminated by
Congress. As previously noted, remnants of the doctrine survive through the
delayed effective date for certain small corporations and through the denial of
realization for the loss that occurs on the nonliquidating distribution of a
depreciated asset.' 9 So long as some portions of the doctrine are retained, tax
policy issues concerning the doctrine continue to be relevant.
II. INTEGRATION
The thesis of this Article is grounded on the premise that, as a matter of
good tax policy and in the absence of considerations of administrative burdens
and politics, corporate and personal income taxes should be integrated so that
the income of a corporation would be subjected to a single tax rate structure.
For convenience, the integration of personal and corporate income taxes is
16. A "qualified person" is an individual, an estate, or certain types of trusts. TRA 1986,
supra note 6, § 633(d)(6)(A). Stock ownership is determined by applying certain stock attribution
rules that will attribute stock owned by an entity to its beneficiaries or owners, and will attribute
stock from one family member to another. I.R.C. § 318 (1987). Congress intended to require that
the ten or fewer persons who hold more than 50076 in value of the corporation's stock have held
that stock for at least five years. CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, H. R.
REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-206 (1986). A technical amendment may be necessary to
effect that holding period requirement. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 100th CONG., 1st SEss. GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 354 n.102 (1987) [hereinafter Blue Book].
17. Section 633(d)(2) of TRA 1986 excludes three types of gains and losses from the deferred
date provision. One of the deletions is for "any gain or loss on a capital asset held for not more
than 6 months." TRA 1986, supra note 6, § 633(d)(2)(B). The obvious purpose of this exception
is to subject short-term capital gains and losses to the recognition requirements of the amended
version of the Code. See Blue Book, supra note 16, at 352. However, as of January 1, 1988, the
holding period requirement for long-term capital gains became more than one year rather than more
than six months. I.R.C. § 1222 (1987). The spirit of the law would require the recognition of gain
or loss for the distribution, after 1987, of an appreciated or depreciated capital asset that was held
for one year or less, but the literal language of the statute requires recognition for the distribution
of a capital asset only if it is held for six months or less. Id.
18. See DAILY TAX REPORT No. 19 G-2 (Jan. 29, 1988).
19. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
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referred to hereafter simply as "integration." Integration has been advocated
by a substantial number of public finance economists. 20 Some forms of partial
integration have been adopted by Canada, the entire European Economic Com-
munity, and virtually every major industrialized nation other than the United
States. 21 In the last fifteen years, there have been numerous proposals for the
United States to adopt some form of integration.Y The House version of the
bill that became TRA 1986 provided a small amount of dividend relief that
constituted a gesture of acceptance of the desirability of integration. 23 Despite
this, Congress has failed to move towards integration. To the contrary, it has
moved further away from integration by removing many of the previously
available relief measures-such as the General Utilities doctrine-from the present
unintegrated corporate tax.
Not everyone accepts the proposition that tax policy is better served by
integration. For example, the late Professor Stanley Surrey rejected integration
as resting on no more than tax theology.24 This article does not seek to add
any new thoughts to the debate over integration, but rather, accepts the inte-
grationist's view and focuses on whether that view leads to the conclusion that
General Utilities should be reinstated. In order to determine the relevance of
the integration concept to the General Utilities doctrine, it is necessary to
understand the various reasons given by the integrationists for the adoption of
that concept. Those reasons are set forth and briefly examined later in this
Article.Y Before examining those reasons and the likely explanation for Congress'
rejection of integration, it will be helpful to consider the forms that integration
can take. o
20. See, e.g., Harberger, The State of The Corporate Income Tax: Who Pays It? Should It
Be Repealed?, in NEW DIRECTONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980's 161-62 (1983); C.
McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 1 (1979); STUDY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, REVISING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX
141 (May 1985) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE STUDY].
21. See Nolan, supra note 14, at 100-01.
22. Tax Reform (Administration and Public Witnesses): Public Hearings before the Comm.
on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) (testimony
of William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury); U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS. BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM 4 (1977) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, supra note 20,
at 141-64; TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 118-19 (1984); GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS
TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 120-29 (1985); H. R. REP. No. 426, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 234-42 (1985).
23. H.R. REP. No. 3838, § 311, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 263 (1985) (providing a 10076 dividend
paid deduction) (available on microfiche at University of Iowa Law Library). In the Treasury
Department's first recommendation to the President (Treasury I) containing the proposals that
ultimately led to the adoption of TRA 1986, the Treasury recommended that a corporation be
allowed a deduction for 50% of the amount of dividends that it paid. TREASURY DEPARTMENT
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH,
VOL. 1 118-19 (Nov. 1984). This proposal provided a far more generous dividend relief than was
proposed in the House bill. Neither of the proposals for dividend relief were adopted.
24. Surrey, Reflections on "Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28
NAT'L TAX J. 335 (1975); see Pechman, Another View of the Corporate Income Tax, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980's 177 (1983).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 31-69.
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A. Forms of Integration and Dividend Relief
Integration can take a number of quite different forms, and the terminology
that is employed by commentators in describing them is not uniform.
26 This
Article adopts what appears to be the more common terminology. Nevertheless,
in the interests of clarity, many of the terms used herein are defined as they
appear.
Integration can be designed to apply to all of a corporation's income,
whether retained or distributed, or it can apply only to distributed earnings. A
system that is limited to distributed earnings is more accurately described as
"dividend relief" rather than a form of integration. The purpose of dividend
relief is to effect integration policies. Consequently, dividend relief systems
commonly have been described as forms of integration. In this Article, they
will be referred to as "partial integration" systems.
Integration could be accomplished by eliminating the corporate tax, allocating
corporate income among the corporation's shareholders, and taxing it directly
to them as part of their personal income. This type of integration is referred
to as "total" or "full" integration.
One means of total integration is to defer the tax on a corporation's income
until distributed to shareholders. Such a deferral would result in a lower tax
burden on corporate earnings than on other income that is taxed in the year
earned. Consequently, this approach would not be adopted unless the deferral
were eliminated or mitigated by some means such as requiring the corporation
to pay a withholdling tax on its earnings, which would then be added to dividends
paid to shareholders who would receive an income tax credit for the withheld
tax. The following simplified example illustrates how this type of total integration
would operate. In this example, there is no separate corporate income tax, but
a corporation pays a withholding tax of thirty percent on its income.
Assume B is the sole shareholder of the X corporation. In year one, X
earns $10,000 of net income, and it makes no distributions to its shareholder.
X pays a withholding tax of $3000. In year two, X has no income or loss, and
X distributes $5000 to B. B is treated as having received, as a dividend, the
amount of corporate earnings that would produce $5000 after the imposition
of a thirty percent withholding tax. Thus, B will include $7143 in his gross
income which will be subject to his personal income tax rate.
27 B is allowed a
tax credit of $2143-the amount of withholding tax paid by X on the $7143
of its earnings that is deemed to have been distributed to B-against his income
tax liability for year two. Thus, the amount distributed to B is grossed up to
include the withholding tax paid by X, and B is allowed a tax credit for the
withholding tax previously paid by the corporation.
26. Compare C. McLuRa, supra note 20, at 3-5 with Feldstein & Frisch, Corporate Tax
Integration: The Estimated Effects on Capital Accumulation and Tax Distribution on Two Integration
Proposals, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 37, 37-52 (1977).
27. The $7143 is the rounded off figure obtained from dividing the $5000 of accumulated
corporate earnings that B received by 7007o. Another method for computing the amount of withholding
tax that is attributable to the corporate distribution is to determine the fraction of retained earnings
that are distributed to B and to multiply that fraction times the $3000 of tax paid by X on its
Year One earnings. Thus, 5/7ths times $3000 is $2143 (the portion of the withholding tax that is
attributable to B's distribution).
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A purer method of total integration is to allocate a corporation's income,
losses, and other tax items among its shareholders at the end of a specified
period, such as a taxable year, regardless of whether the income has been
distributed or retained. This method, sometimes referred to as "pass-through
total integration," operates in the familiar manner that is applied to "S"
corporations and to partnerships. 2 There are a number of administrative difficulties
in employing this approach. For example, there are difficulties in allocating the
corporation's income among shareholders holding different classes of stock
representing different rights and priorities. Tiers of stock ownership by several
corporations, and sales of stock during a taxable year raise difficult allocation
questions. Difficult policy questions arise with respect to the proper treatment
of shareholders who are nonresident aliens and those who are tax exempt entities.
Despite these and other administrative problems, a 1977 Treasury Department
study recommended the adoption of this form of integration. 29 The administrative
difficulties caused by "pass-through total integration" are so burdensome that
it is neither likely nor desirable that total integration will be adopted in this
country. If any comprehensive system of integration is ever adopted, it is more
likely to be some form of partial integration.
Instead of subjecting corporate income to a single tax at the shareholder's
personal tax rates, the separate corporate income tax could be retained, but the
double tax imposition could be mitigated or eliminated entirely by providing
some type of dividend relief. That is, the corporation could be allowed a deduction
for all or some fraction of the dividend payments it makes; the corporation
could be taxed at a lower rate on distributed income than it is on retained
income; or the amount paid to a shareholder as a dividend could be grossed
up for all or a fraction of the corporate tax attributable to the distributed
income and the shareholder could be allowed a tax credit of an equal amount.
These various forms of dividend relief often are referred to as "partial integration."
They are distinguishable from "total integration" in that partial integration
operates on distributed earnings only, whereas total integration operates on both
retained and distributed earnings. This distinction is especially meaningful for
the pass-through type of total integration that is similar to the Subchapter S
provisions of the Code. In truth, there is no substantive difference between the
withholding tax form of total integration and the imposition of a separate
corporate tax with tax credits provided to shareholders who receive dividend
payments, and for that reason the withholding tax approach may well be described
as a form of partial integration.
A partial integration system need not impose a greater tax burden than is
imposed by a total integration system. If the dividend relief is complete-for
example, if the entire amount of a dividend is deductible or if the shareholder
receives a tax credit for the entire amount of the corporate tax that was paid
on the distributed income-the tax burden will be equal to that imposed by a
28. An "S" corporation is a corporation that successfully has elected to have taxes on it
and its shareholders determined under Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter S of the Code. I.R.C. §
1361(a)(1) (1987). With only three exceptions, an "S" corporation does not pay federal income
taxes, and its tax attributes (income, deductions, credits, and the like) are allocated among its
shareholders and treated as if incurred directly by them. Id. §§ 1363(a), 1366.
29. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 22, at 68-75.
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"pass-through system," provided that the shareholder and the corporation are
in the same tax bracket. However, the typical partial integration system that is
proposed for this country or that has been adopted by a foreign country, does
not provide complete dividend relief.
30
B. The Case for Integration
Before considering the merits of an integrated corporate tax over the present
unintegrated tax, it is useful to consider precisely what it is that an income tax
system seeks to tax. The prevalent definition of income, as that term is employed
in the income tax world, is the Haig-Simons definition. Haig-Simons defines
income as "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and the end of the period in question."'" Under this definition,
the personal income tax can be viewed as a tax on the sum of the value of a
taxpayer's consumption in a taxable period plus the value of the increase in
that taxable period of the taxpayer's power to consume in the future. An income
tax on savings, then, is a tax on consumption that will take place in the future.
The imposition of an income tax on savings creates a bias in favor of
current consumption over savings that distorts spending choices. For example,
if, in Year One, G earns a dollar of income which he spends in that year on
personal consumption, he will receive a dollar's worth of consumption in that
taxable year and will pay an income tax on that one dollar. If, instead, G were
to retain the dollar as savings and spend it on consumption in Year Ten, he
will be taxed in Year One on a dollar's consumption that he did not enjoy
until Year Ten. 32 The present value in Year One of the dollar's worth of
consumption that G had in Year Ten is substantially less than one dollar. To
derive the maximum economic benefit from his taxed dollar, G would do better
to spend it in the year earned rather than save it. That is not to say there is
no incentive for G to save. The more one consumes, the more the utility derived
from additional consumption will diminish. At some point, the utility of saving
for future consumption, even given a tax bias, is greater than the utility of
currently consuming another dollar.
30. See C. McLutRE, supra note 20, at 3-5; Nolan, supra note 14, at 100-01. McLure adopts
a slightly different definition for the terms partial and total integration than are used herein.
31. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938); see also HAIG, The Concept of Income,
in THE FEDERAL INComE TAx 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921), reprinted in AMERICAN EcoNomIc ASSOCIATIo N,
READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (1959). The Haig-Simons definition is useful for
exploring the general aims of the income tax system. It often is a starting point for those who
advocate or employ a Tax Expenditure Budget concept, but the definition is not applied strictly.
See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 22, at 22-23. The author believes that it would be a mistake to attempt
to apply the Haig-Simons definition literally or inflexibly in determining the "neutrality" of specific
income tax provisions. Many considerations (e.g. administrative costs) shape the determination of
the base against which an income tax is applied and must be taken into account in determining
whether a tax provision provides preferential treatment to certain taxpayers. The author hopes to
explore this issue in detail in a later writing.
32. G can invest the dollar that he retains and earn income that will increase his ability to
consume in the future. The increased future consumption does not fully compensate G for having
been taxed on the retained dollar since the investment earnings also will be taxed. G will be taxed
currently on the value of the dollar for future consumption. He also will be taxed on the increased
consumption power that he derives from earnings produced by that invested dollar.
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The taxation of the earnings derived from savings may be viewed as the
cause of distortion in spending choices. Assume, for example, that a dollar
invested today for a one year period will produce ten cents of income at the
end of that period so that the investor will then have $1.10 to use for consumption.
The present value of $1.10 of consumption to take place in one year, therefore,
is one dollar. If G earns one dollar of income in Year One, the taxation of
that dollar reflects the present value of the $1.10 of consumption that it can
provide G in one year's time. However, the ten cents of earnings that the dollar
produces over that year also is subjected to an income tax. Thus, the ten cents
investment earnings is taxed twice. The taxation of the one dollar that G saved
in Year One represents a tax on the present value of G's future consumption
of that dollar plus a tax on his future consumption ability resulting from the
income earned by that dollar.
Other considerations, such as the diminishing utility of additional current
consumption, can outweigh this tax bias against savings. However this bias is
a matter of concern especially when aggravated by inflation that also triggers
a bias for current consumption. The discussion below explains how the concern
over a tax bias against savings impacts on the desirability of an integrated tax
system.
1. The Conduit View
Integrationists adopt the premise that a corporation is merely a fictional
entity given a jural status for certain purposes. This entity actually represents
the aggregation of investments by its shareholders." It is a relatively easy second
step to conclude that the tax on the earnings from pooled savings3 4 should not
be greater than the tax on earnings from savings that are not so pooled or are
pooled through participation in a partnership." This conclusion rests both on
a concern for horizontal and vertical equity 6 and on a concern that the larger
tax burden imposed on corporate investment distorts the allocation of capital
among commercial ventures.
McLure has described the conduit view as central to the case for integration
in the United States.3 7 However, as will be shown, there are reasons to adopt
integration even if the conduit view is rejected. Indeed, as McLure also notes,
many foreign countries which have rejected the conduit view nevertheless have
adopted partial integration systems. 38
33. C. McLuRE, supra note 20, at 20.
34. Individual savings are combined (pooled) in order to enhance the size of the capital
projects in which the investors (shareholders) can participate.
35. A partnership also represents a pooling of savings and services. The federal income tax
system does not impose a tax on a partnership entity. I.R.C. § 701 (1987). Instead, partnership
income and other tax attributes are allocated among the partners and treated as if incurred directly
by the partners. Id. §§ 701-704. A partnership files a federal income tax return, Form 1065, only
for informational purposes.
36. Horizontal equity is achieved when persons having the same amount of income pay the
same amount of income tax. Vertical equity is achieved when persons having disparate amounts of
income pay a disparate amount of income tax with the amount of the difference in taxes bearing
a relationship to the difference in their income levels. See M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL
PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 371-72 (1987).
37. C. McLuRE, supra note 20, at 20.
38. Id. at 44-45.
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The opponents of integration reject the conduit view. They contend that
while the conduit view of a corporation accurately describes a closely-held
corporation, it is unrealistic to apply that view to publicly-held corporations.39
Through its managers, the publicly-held corporation typically has directions and
goals that are independent of and sometimes adverse to those of its shareholders.
Even so, the shareholders' surrender of a substantial portion of their control
over the management of their funds does not alter the fact that they are the
beneficial owners of those funds and that a tax on corporate earnings is a tax
on earnings from the shareholders' savings.
In any event, even the opponents to integration agree that the conduit view
is accurate for closely-held corporations. ° Accordingly, there is no conceptual
justification for failing to integrate the taxation of the earnings of closely-held
corporations. Congress implicitly has recognized the propriety of treating the
assets of a closely-held corporation as the aggregate of its shareholders' investments
by permitting integration treatment for such corporations when they elect to
become an "S" corporation . 4 The significance to the question of the desirability
of reinstating a General Utilities doctrine of adopting the conduit view for
closely-held corporations will be explored later in this Article. 42
Another aspect of the conduit view, if adopted, is that an unintegrated
corporate tax exacerbatesthe inequity and economic bias engendered by imposing
an income tax on savings. An income tax on the earnings derived from savings
can be viewed as a double tax because the tax imposed on the principal amount
on which savings interest is earned by the taxpayer incorporates a tax on the
future earnings that are subsequently derived from the investment of the present
savings.43 The capital that is invested in a corporation represents savings that
have previously been taxed. A tax on corporate earnings then is a double tax
to the same extent that a tax on all earnings from savings is a double tax.
However, because the corporate tax is unintegrated, there is a third tax level
imposed on corporate earnings when they are distributed as dividends to the
shareholders. Thus, in many cases, the unintegrated corporate income tax system
constitutes a triple tax on savings. Regardless of the terminology employed, the
tax bias against savings is exacerbated when the corporate form is adopted.
Part III of this Article will consider the extent to which the income tax
law provides mitigation for the double or triple tax on corporate earnings." In
that context, Part IV of this Article will examine whether General Utilities
justifiably mitigated the effects of the otherwise unintegrated corporate tax.
The reference above to double or triple tax impositions is simply one way
to emphasize that the effective tax rate that is imposed on earnings from corporate
investments is greater than the tax rate that would be imposed if an individual
were to invest in a noncorporate form. The objection to the unintegrated corporate
tax, especially by those who hold a conduit view of corporations, is not that
corporate income is taxed twice or more. Rather, the objection is that a person
39. See R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 24-43 (Wiley ed. 1951).
40. Id.
41. See sources cited supra note 28.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 96-123.
43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 72-95.
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who invests in corporate form will bear a higher tax on the earnings derived
from that investment than he would bear if he invested in a noncorporate form.
2. Distortion of Capital Investments
Even if the conduit view is rejected, the financial and economic consequences
of having an unintegrated tax may be regarded as sufficiently undesirable to
warrant the elimination, or at least the mitigation, of that tax burden. If, because
of the unintegrated corporate tax, the return on investments in corporate form
is less than the return on investments in noncorporate form, then capital will
shift away from corporate ventures to those operated in noncorporate form.
There are nontax reasons for conducting certain types of businesses in corporate
form and, thus, despite the added tax burden, activities will be conducted in
corporate form. The flight of capital from corporate businesses will result in a
reduction of the goods produced by corporations, and the increase in capital
invested in noncorporate businesses will result in an increase in the goods produced
by those businesses. Consequently, the rate of return from corporate investments
will increase and the return from noncorporate investments will decline. This
increase and decline in the rates of return will continue until the rates of return
for corporate and noncorporate enterprises are in equilibrium. When that occurs,
there will be no bias with respect to the type of investment to make because
the return will be the same for both types. This equilibrium will create an
overproduction of goods in the noncorporate sector and an underproduction in
the corporate sector. In that event, consumers will overpay for corporate goods
and underpay for noncorporate goods. If the imposition of an integrated corporate
tax causes a substitution of the production of goods between industries, there
will be a net welfare loss. 45
If the above statement of the effect of the corporate tax on capital allocation
is correct, that alone is a ground for considering the adoption of an integrated
system. It is far from clear, however, that the tax has that consequence. Some
economists contend that the corporate tax has no relevance to the allocation of
capital investments.46 Harberger, one of the leading advocates of the theory that
the corporate tax affects the rate of return on all capital, has suggested that
when capital is free to move to foreign investments, and when a separate corporate
tax burden is not imposed by foreign countries, the shift to a noncorporate
form will not take place because the capital will go abroad. In that situation,
the burden of the corporate tax may not be placed upon capital but rather may
be borne by labor in the form of depressed wages. 47 In that regard, it is
noteworthy that, as previously discussed, most industrial countries other than
45. See Harberger, supra note 20, at 164-65. The theory that the burden caused by the
corporate tax is borne by all capital investments is sometimes referred to as the "Harberger shift."
46. See C. McLuRE, supra note 20, at 34-35; Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy,
and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PuB. ECON. 1 (1973).
47. Harberger, supra note 20, at 166. Joseph A. Pechman agrees with Harberger's analysis
that the corporate tax is borne by capital unless it can flee to foreign countries that do not impose
a similar tax burden, in which case employees and other citizens will bear the burden of the
corporate tax. Pechman, however, rejects integration as a solution. Pechman, supra note 24, at
177.
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Whether or not the corporate tax burden alone causes a distortion of capital
investment, the operation of the tax induces corporations to rely more on debt
than they otherwise would and may provide an incentive for corporations to
retain their earnings rather than to distribute them.
49 The advantages of debt
over equity in the current corporate tax structure is obvious. Interest payable
by a corporation on its debt is deductible" and is not subject to double taxation.
The corporation's repayment of a debt typically will be a return of the creditor's
capital and will not cause the creditor to recognize income as a consequence
of receiving that repayment. On the other hand, a redemption of corporate
stock may cause the shareholder to recognize ordinary dividend income.',
If a corporation is led to an excessively large debt-capital ratio, there are
several negative consequences. The burden of a large fixed interest obligation
can adversely affect corporate expansion or even the corporation's survival. The
corporation will be poorly positioned to survive a temporary downturn in its
business. The potential for bankruptcy makes a large debt structure especially
undesirable. If a general downturn occurs in the economy, the proliferation of
highly leveraged corporations may lead to the bankruptcy of a large number
of businesses which, in turn, would cause a loss of confidence by investors,
and a corresponding reduction in the amount of capital that will be invested
in corporate form.
5 2
Under certain circumstances, the current tax system creates a bias in favor
of retention of corporate earnings rather than distributing them as dividends.
The nature of this bias and the condition under which it exists are worth
examining.
The unintegrated tax on corporate earnings creates a burden on investment
in corporate form that is not imposed on noncorporate investments.
3 But, once
funds have been committed to a corporate enterprise, is the corporation's decision
to retain or to distribute its earnings influenced by the imposition of a corporate
tax? The answer to that question is not as straightforward as a casual glance
might suggest. For example, suppose a corporation and a shareholder can earn
the same rate of return on their investments-the rate to be determined on a
before-tax basis-and the marginal tax rate of the corporation is equal to the
marginal rate of the shareholder. If we assume that corporate earnings will
ultimately be distributed to the shareholder as a dividend, the after-tax dollar
amount that the shareholder will receive is exactly the same if the corporation
distributes its earnings currently to the shareholder who then invests the net
amount remaining after payment of taxes, as it is if the corporation retains its
48. See supra text accompanying note 21.
49. M. Fox, supra note 36, at 368-70.
50. In general, interest paid or accrued by a corporate debtor is deductible under § 163(a)
of the Code. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1987). The limitations on the deductibility of investment interest and
personal interest do not apply to corporate debtors. Id. §§ 163(d), (h).
51. Id. §§ 301(c), 302(d).
52. M. Fox, supra note 36, at 393-94.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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earnings, invests them, and later distributes the net income (after taxes) from
such investments to the shareholder.
Consider the following example. G, an individual, owns all of the outstanding
stock of the X corporation. X has an ample amount of earnings and profits.
G and X are in the same marginal tax bracket. They both are taxed on income
at the marginal rate of thirty percent. 4 X earns a before-tax profit equal to
ten percent of its investment. Similarly, on G's noncorporate investments, G
earns a before-tax profit of ten percent of his investment. All of the income
that is earned by G and X is ordinary income. In year one, X has after-tax
income of $100. X can either invest that $100 at a ten percent return and later
pay a dividend to G of the $100 retained earnings plus the after-tax income
earned from investing that $100, or X can promptly distribute the $100 to G
who can then invest the net after tax income at a ten percent rate of return.
In either event, as shown below, the amount that G obtains after taxes will be
the same.
First, consider the consequence of having X distribute the $100 to G in
year one as a dividend. G will pay a tax of $30 on that dividend and will then
have $70 to invest. Because G's investments earn a ten percent return, G will
earn $7 of income after a one year period. G will pay a tax of $2.10 (30% X
$7) on that income and after taxes G will retain $4.90 of his income from the
investment. After one year, G will have a total of $74.90 from the distribution
of X's earnings plus the net income from investing that amount.
On the other hand, consider what occurs if X retains the $100 of earnings
and invests them at ten percent. After one year, X will earn income of $10 on
its investment, and X will pay a tax of $3 on that income. Thus, X will retain
$7 after taxes from its investment. If X promptly distributes a $7 dividend to
G, he will pay a tax of $2.10. Thus, G will retain the sum of $4.90 after taxes
from the income from the investment of the corporation's $100 of retained
earnings. Note that this amount is identical to the amount that G would have
retained if the $100 had been distributed to G in year one and the net proceeds
then invested directly by G himself. Of course, if, at the end of the one year
period X distributed to G, as a dividend, the original $100 of retained earnings,
G would retain $70 of that amount after payment of taxes. The total amount
retained by G would then be $74.90, the identical amount that G would have
retained if he had received a current distribution of the $100 in Year One and
had then invested the net proceeds.
If the marginal tax bracket of the shareholder is lower than that of the
corporation and if the other assumptions made above are applicable, the amount
retained by the shareholder will be greater if the corporation currently distributes
its earnings rather than retains and invests them. In the context of some small
corporations with taxable income of less than $75,000, it is possible that the
54. Under current law, neither G nor X can be in the 30% tax bracket. The maximum
marginal rate on X's taxable income is 34%. I.R.C. § 11(b) (1987). The maximum marginal rate
on G's taxable income is either 28% or 33%. Id. § 1. The 30% rate is used in the example in
the text for ease of calculation. The same rate is used for both the individual and the corporation
in order to illustrate the concept that tax consequences are neutral in that circumstance, given the
assumptions listed in the text.
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corporation's marginal rate will be less than that of its shareholders." If the
corporation has taxable income in excess of $335,000, the corporation's tax rate
will be a flat thirty-four percent rate. Such corporations always will be in a
higher tax bracket than are their individual shareholders, who cannot be taxed
at a rate in excess of thirty-three percent.1
6 It would seem, then, that for such
corporations there is a tax bias inducing the corporations to distribute their
earnings currently rather than to retain and invest them. Several reasons suggest
the opposite may be true; that there are tax incentives for the corporation to
retain its earnings.
First, the corporation, through its accumulation of a large amount of capital,
can make investments that produce a rate of return that may not be available
to the individual shareholder if he invests separately in his own right. Therefore,
the assumption that the corporation and the shareholder can earn the same rate
of return will be unrealistic in many cases. A shareholder can invest in a
partnership form and, thereby, obtain the advantage of a larger pool of capital
without having to incur double taxation, but the availability of such investments
is limited in that there are certain types of activities that cannot readily be
conducted in a noncorporate form.
7 Of course, if the shareholder has to invest
in another domestic corporation to obtain the same return on investment, the
second corporation's income will be subjected to double taxation, and the
shareholder will net much less than he would receive if the first corporation
retained and invested its earnings. For example, if G, in the example above,
were to invest the $70 of after-tax dividend that he obtained in year one in a
second corporation, Y, and if Y earned a return of ten percent on its investments,
55. Except for personal service corporations, a corporation with taxable income of less than
$100,000 pays taxes at a rate of 15% on its first $50,000 of taxable income, and it pays taxes at
a rate of 25% on its next $25,000 of taxable income. Id. § 11(b). An individual's tax rates are
graduated as follows: 15076, then 28%, then 330o, and then back down to 28%. Id. § 1. It is
possible, therefore, that an individual shareholder could be in a higher tax bracket than is the
corporation.
56. The tax rate figures used in the text are based on the rate schedules adopted by TRA
1986 and effective for the taxable year 1988. It is noteworthy that TRA 1986 substantially expanded
the scope of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) for corporations and thereby increased the tax
liability borne by many corporate enterprises. Id. §§ 55-57. While the scope of the AMT for
individuals also was expanded, the impact of the 1986 revisions will fall primarily on corporations.
See Freeman, Some Early Strategies for the Methodical Disincorporation of America After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986: Grafting Partnerships Onto C Corporations, Running Amok with the Master
Limited Partnership Concept, and Generally Endeavoring to Defeat the Intention of the Draftsmen
of the Repeal of General Utilities, 64 TAxEs 962, 963 (1986). This is largely due to the inclusion
for AMT purposes of a positive adjustment to taxable income for a fraction of the difference
between a corporation's book income or its earnings and profits and a modified version of its
taxable income. I.R.C. §§ 56(0, (g) (1987). Because of the AMT, more individuals will pay a lesser
tax on business income that they earn in a noncorporate form than the tax that would be payable
by a corporation if the business is incorporated, and the spread between the tax borne by individuals
and corporations will expand.
57. For example, the limited liability provided to shareholders can be of great importance
to investors in a business that has a risk of a large amount of loss. So, corporate form may be
imperative for a business with potential liability for large tort claims or for a volatile business.
Also, if investors wish to have different types of interests in a business, including tiered ownership,
that can be accomplished easier in corporate form than in partnership form. Another consideration
for publicly-held enterprises is that corporate stocks are easier to market than are partnership
interests.
[Summer
HeinOnline  -- 13 J. Corp. L. 966 1987-1988
General Utilities Reinstated
Y would earn $7 of income, pay a tax of $2.10, and then have only $4.90 to
distribute to G as a dividend. G would pay a tax of $1.47 on that $4.90 dividend,
and G would retain only $3.43 after taxes. 'This amount compares unfavorably
with the $4.90 that G would obtain if X retained the $100 of its net earnings
and distributed the net income therefrom to G.
A second consideration is that in order to get a corporation's retained
earnings into the hands of a shareholder, it might not be necessary to distribute
them as a dividend. If the earnings and income therefrom are retained, they
can be distributed to G, to his estate, or to his heirs at some future date as
a stock redemption or as a liquidating distribution. Because of the elimination
of preferential tax treatment of capital gains, 58 it would make little difference
whether the distribution to G is a dividend or a liquidating distribution. However,
if G holds his stock until his death, a subsequent liquidating distribution may
not cause G's estate or heirs to incur any income tax liability because of the
step-up in basis at death provided by section 1014.19
A minor consideration is that if a corporation retains its earnings and invests
them in the stock of a domestic corporation, only thirty percent of the dividend
income it receives on that stock will be subject to tax. 60 Thus, the effective
corporate tax rate on the dividend income received from a domestic corporation
will be only thirty percent of the rate that otherwise would be applicable. A
corporation in a thirty-four percent marginal tax bracket will, therefore, pay
tax at a rate of only 10.2% on the dividend income it receives from a domestic
corporation.
In the American Law Institute's (ALl) publication of its Federal Income
Tax Project on the Study of Subchapter C,61 the ALl published a study of its
reporter, Professor Andrews, that addressed the tax treatment of retained earnings.
6 2
Professor Andrews noted that an unintegrated tax system creates a bias in favor
of a corporation borrowing needed capital rather than obtaining it as an investment
in the corporation. 6 To neutralize that bias, Professor Andrews recommended
that dividends paid from earnings derived from invested capital be deductible
by the corporation. 64 This proposed dividend relief is a form of partial integration.
Professor Andrews also recognized that the current tax system favors the
retention of corporate earnings in corporate solution. He states that the deferral
of a shareholder's tax on his share of corporate earnings is comparable to
allowing the shareholder a deduction for making a capital contribution to a
corporation. 65 Because that bias already exists, Professor Andrews recommended
58. See TRA 1986, supra note 6, § 301, at 2216.
59. I.R.C. § 1014 (1987).
60. Id. § 243(a)(1).
61. ALl, Federal Income Tax Project on Subchapter C (1982).
62. Id. at 327.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 328.
65. Id. at 330. Professor Andrews does not claim that the deferral of a shareholder's tax
on retained earnings is identical to granting a deduction for inve.qting in a corporation, but he does
believe that the results are similar. Professor Andrews notes that the current tax system favors
distributing corporate earnings if the shareholder is in a lower tax bracket than the corporation.
Id. at 359. As noted in the text, because of the changes made in 1986 to the tax rate schedules,
in many circumstances individual shareholders will be in a lower tax bracket than the corporation.
However, other considerations may counteract what appears to be a bias in favor of corporate
distribution of earnings where' the shareholder is in a lower tax bracket than the corporation.
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that no deduction, that is, no partial integration, be provided for dividends paid
out of income derived from retained earnings as contrasted to income derived
from newly contributed equity capital.66 'Professor Andrews made those
recommendations several years prior to the adoption of TRA 1986. As noted
above, in light of the changes that were made in the tax rate schedules, it is
unclear the extent to which there continues to be a tax bias in favor of retention
of corporate earnings.
67
A question arises whether it is undesirable to have tax laws structured to
encourage the retention of corporate earnings. Some commentators believe that
the retention of corporate earnings promotes inefficiency and a disinclination
to engage in innovative projects. 68 If a corporation's earnings were distributed
to its shareholders, the corporation would have to compete with the shareholder's
other investment opportunities for the reinvestment of those earnings. This
competition should result in the placement of the earnings where they will be
most productive. On the other hand, if the corporation can retain its earnings,
it can use them to finance projects that may be less productive than others
available in the market. One problem with this view is that the transactional
costs of the distribution and reinvestment of the earnings and the imperfection
of an investor's available information have to be taken into account. Another
consideration in favor of the retention of corporate earnings is that the propensity
of the American public for consumption suggests that a portion of dividend
payments will be used for consumption rather than for reinvestment.
Regardless of whether it is more or less desirable for corporations to retain
their earnings to finance new ventures or the expansion of old ventures, there
is reason to avoid allowing the retention or distribution decision to be influenced
by the tax laws. If a legislative decision were made that it is in the best interests
of the economy and of society to encourage corporations either to retain or to
disgorge their earnings, then a deliberate legislative choice might utilize the tax
law to provide a benefit for taking the desired action or to impose an added
burden on the undesired action. But, in the absence of a deliberate legislative
decision to influence corporate action, the tax laws should be designed to be
as neutral as is feasible given other considerations. In other words, an unintended
nudge in one direction is more likely than not to be harmful.
There are three possible solutions to the question of the proper legislative
response to the issue of the desirability of a corporation's distributing its earnings
currently. One possibility is that there is no universal preference and that the
decision should be left to the corporation and to market influences on management's
ad hoc decision. A second possibility is that market influences are not adequate
to offset the bias of management to retain earnings and that legislative pressure
should be exerted to induce management to distribute its earnings currently. A
third possibility is that it is more desirable to have corporations retain and
reinvest their earnings and that legislative pressure should be exerted to offset
the shareholders' desire for current distributions. Because there are three possible
solutions, albeit of different degrees of likelihood, a legislative act that
66. Id. at 330-31, 358-400.
67. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
68. See M. Fox, supra note 36, at 191-202. But see M. NORR, THE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 22-23 (1982).
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unintentionally skews the corporation's decision in one direction is more likely
to be wrong because it adversely impacts on two of the three possible solutions.
Employing a "pass-through" system to integrate the corporate and individual
income taxes would eliminate any bias that currently exists in favor of the
retention of corporate earnings. Alternatively, the bias could be eliminated by
making other tax changes that offset the benefit currently provided for retained
earnings in certain circumstances, but those changes are likely to create new
biases that influence a different set of corporate or financial decisions. One of
the side effects of adopting a tax provision to neutralize the impact of taxes
on the choice between alternative courses of action is that the new provision
will create a tax preference for or against certain other choices. 69 For the purposes
of this Article, it is sufficient to note that one of the consequences of having
an unintegrated tax is that in some circumstances it creates a tax bias in favor
of retention of corporate earnings.
In sum, if a conduit view of a corporation is adopted, an unintegrated tax
is inequitable in that it taxes the earnings from investments that are made in
corporate solution at a higher rate than those imposed on earnings from
noncorporate investments. The significance of equity considerations is weakened
somewhat because of the uncertainty of the extent to which the corporate tax
burden is borne by shareholders. Regardless of whether a conduit view is adopted,
the unintegrated tax has the following undesirable consequences: (1) Distorting
the allocation of capital among different types of investments which, in turn,
results in the overproduction of some types of goods and the underproduction
of others so that there is an overall welfare loss; (2) encouraging excessive
leveraging of corporations, which has numerous adverse financial consequences,
including an increase in the number of bankruptcies that occur when there is
a downturn in the economy; and (3) influencing the decision whether to retain
corporate earnings and commit them to corporate ventures or to distribute them
to the shareholders.
69. For example, in the absence of special provisions, the tax law creates a bias in favor
of performing services for one's self or one's family rather than to pay another to perform that
task (in which event, the taxpayer then can use the released time to produce additional income or
for leisure). This bias exists because gross income does not include services performed for one's
self or one's family, but the payments to another to perform those services are not deductible
expenses. For example, when parents have a young child, it is often necessary to choose between
having one spouse stay at home and care for the child, or having both spouses employed on a
full time basis with the child cared for by some type of child care arrangement. The fact that a
spouse's services of caring for the child will not be included in the spouses' gross income and that
the payment for child care services will not be deductible creates a tax bias in favor of having one
of the spouses stay home and care for the child. For social policy and political reasons, Congress
chose to minimize that tax bias so that the decision whether to seek employment or to remain
home can be made without as much regard to tax consequences. Currently, that minimization of
tax consequences is accomplished by providing a tax credit for a portion of the child care (or other
dependent care) expenses incurred to permit the taxpayer to be gainfully employed. I.R.C. § 21(b)(2)(C)
(1986). While that tax credit neutralizes much of the tax influence on the decision to work or to
care for one's child, it also reduces the cost of rearing a child and thereby creates a tax bias in
favor of having children. That is not to say that people who would not otherwise want children
will decide to have them because of the tax credit. Rather, it is to say that people who want
children, but who are deterred by the financial cost of bearing nondeductible and noncreditable
expenses, or by having one spouse cease to be employed, will find the cost more economically
feasible because of the credit. For some families that difference will be just enough to tip the
balance in favor of having a child.
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C. An Explanation of Congress' Failure to Integrate Corporate and
Individual Taxes
If integration is as beneficial as described above, why has Congress retained
an unintegrated tax system? Indeed, why has Congress deleted from the Code
most of those provisions that provided some relief from the double tax system
and thereby accentuated the impact of the unintegrated corporate tax? One can
only speculate regarding the reasons for Congress' behavior.
One possible explanation is that a majority of Congress rejects the conduit
view of a corporation and, accordingly, rejects much of the ground on which
the case for integration lies. Even if that is so for large corporations, it does
not explain why small, closely-held corporations are subjected to a double tax
unless they qualify for and elect Subchapter S treatment. There are a number
of outstanding tax commentators who embrace the unintegrated tax approach
on various grounds. 70 The Congressional adoption of that approach cannot be
described as wholly unjustified.
A more cynical explanation exists for the policy decision to retain an
unintegrated tax. It is quite likely that most members of Congress have no view
whatsoever with respect to whether, for tax purposes, a corporation should be
viewed as an aggregate of investments by its shareholders or as a separate entity.
They-may care very little about the inequity of taxing income derived in corporate
form at a higher rate than income earned directly or in partnership form. Instead,
Congress may simply view the unintegrated corporate tax as a useful means of
raising revenue without stirring a rebellion among those who bear the burden
of the tax.
71
One major political advantage of an unintegrated corporate tax is that the
incidence of the tax is hidden. It appears to be a tax on an inanimate entity
and, therefore, can relieve some of the tax burden that is carried by natural
persons. Those persons who actually bear the incidence of the corporate tax
are generally unaware of it. Even economists are uncertain where the final burden
will rest.
Of course, the ultimate consequence of taxing corporate income will fall
on natural persons. In the short run, those persons are almost certain to be
the shareholders. In the long run, however, some of the incidence of the corporate
tax may fall on the employees of the corporation and on the consumers who
purchase the goods or services of the corporation. It is easier to "sell" the tax
to the public if they believe that the tax is borne by others. Indeed, many
members of the public rejoice at the taxing of corporations that are viewed as
excessively wealthy institutions that have prospered by failing to pay their fair
share of the costs of maintaining a government. If the tax were seen as a tax
on wages or as a sales tax on consumers, it would lose much of its appeal.
70. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 24; Pechman, supra note 24.
71. One tax mission described the corporate tax as "politically popular, easy to administer,
and productive of substantial revenues." U.S. TAX MISSION TO JAPAN (Shoup Mission), 1 REPORT
ON JAPANESE TAXATION 105 (quoted in M. NORR, supra note 68, at 30, where Norr added: "There
are fewer corporations and shareholders than individual citizens, and shareholders may be less
inclined to resist corporate taxes or tax increases than to resist individual taxes or tax increases").
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One reason offered in support of the unintegrated corporate tax is that it
increases the progressivity of the tax system. Because those with relatively small
amounts of income do not have disposable dollars to invest, most shareholders
are commonly in the middle or high income tax brackets. Assuming that most
of the incidence of the corporate tax falls on shareholders, the corporate tax
is a means of increasing the effective tax rate of higher income taxpayers. The
interest in increasing progressivity may be especially strong in light of the
essentially flat-rate tax system that went into effect in 1988 for individual
taxpayers. On the other hand, the enhancement of a more progressive tax structure
appears to be inconsistent with the apparent goal of TRA 1986 to move towards
a relatively flat-rate system.
The progressivity rationale appears to be somewhat strained. It would be
preferable to deal with the progressivity question directly in the tax rate schedules
for individuals. This is especially true since the corporate tax system causes a
distortion in the types of goods produced, which gives rise to an overall welfare
loss. Also, .to the extent that the incidence of the tax falls on labor and consumers,
rather than on the shareholders, the tax will not provide progressivity.
III. MITIGATION OF THE UNINTEGRATED TAX SYSTEM
The tax law always has provided some mitigation or escape valve from the
imposition of double taxation on corporate income. Some of those relief pro-
visions-such as the small exclusion that was provided to noncorporate share-
holders for dividends received from domestic corporations-were eliminated by
TRA 1986.72 Others still survive, but there is much less relief under current law
than previously existed.
A corporation may escape the double tax burden by employing its share-
holders and paying them a salary for their services. A reasonable salary typically
will be deductible by the corporate employer under Section 162 as a business
expense, 73 unless the services were provided in connection with the creation of
a capital asset. 74 In Charles McCandless Tile Service v. United States,75 the
Commissioner successfully contended that a profitable corporation could not
avoid dividend characterization of amounts paid to its shareholder-employees by
designating all such payments as salary, even if the salary was reasonable in
amount. 76 The court recharacterized as dividends a portion of the amounts paid
to the shareholder-employees. Consequently, that amount was not deductible by
the corporation. This approach became known as the "automatic dividend"
rule. Subsequent court decisions rejected the automatic dividend rule, and the
Commissioner eventually conceded that the rule announced by the court in
72. Section 612 of TRA 1986 repealed the dividend exclusion for individuals. TRA 1986,
supra note 6, § 612, at 2250. Prior to that repeal, the first $100 of qualified dividends received
by an individual shareholder ($200 for a married couple filing jointly) were excluded from income
by § 116 of the Code.
73. I.R.C. § 162 (1987).
74. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13 (1974).
75. 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
76. Id. at 1339-40.
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Charles McCandless Tile was incorrect. 77 The payment of salaries to shareholder-
employees, therefore, remains a viable method of avoiding double tax conse-
quences for small, closely-held corporations. Because of their size, publicly-held
corporations cannot employ most of their shareholders.
Another means of avoiding double taxation is to have shareholders refrain
from contributing needed properties to the corporation and, instead, have them
lease the property to the corporation. The rental expense may be deductible by
the corporation under section 162 as a business expense. 78 Again, this device
will be useful only to small, closely-held corporations.
A widely adopted means of reducing the sting of double taxation is to
obtain much of the corporation's needed capital by incurring a proportionately
larger amount of debt rather than seeking equity contributions. There are serious
negative consequences to having a corporation incur a high debt-capital ratio,
79
but the importance of minimizing the impact of double taxation is so great that
many businesses are willing to accept the risks and burdens of being heavily
leveraged. Leveraging is used by both large and small corporations.
The General Utilities doctrine provided another measure of relief for the
failure to integrate fully. When a corporation distributed an appreciated asset
to a shareholder, only a single tax was imposed unless one of the exceptions
to General Utilities was applicable. While, with respect to nonliquidating dis-
tributions, the General Utilities doctrine was eroded over the years, it remained
substantially intact with respect to liquidating distributions until the doctrine
was repudiated by the adoption of TRA 1986.80
A related provision to the General Utilities doctrine was the pre-1986 version
of section 337 that granted nonrecognition to a liquidating corporation for certain
sales of its assets pursuant to the liquidation. This provision was subject to
certain exceptions and was available only if there was compliance with several
conditicns. This provision was repealed by TRA 1986.
Tht -.e appears to have been several considerations that led Congress to
repudiate the General Utilities doctrine and allied provisions. These considerations
are discussed in Part IV of this Article.
81
For closely-held corporations that qualify for Subchapter S treatment, an
election to be an "S" corporation is a means of avoiding double taxation. In
general, an "S" corporation pays no federal income taxes, and its tax attributes
are passed on to its shareholders.12 However, if a "C" corporation 3 elects to
77. Edwin's, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 675, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1974); Laure v. Com-
missioner, 70 T.C. 1087, 1098 (1978); see also Rev. Rul. 79-8, 1979-1 C.B. 92-93. A purported
salary payment can be recharacterized as a disguised dividend if there is evidence that the payment
was not made for services, or to the extent that the amount of the payment is unreasonably large.
However, the automatic dividend rule is dead.
78. I.R.C. § 162 (1987).
79. See supra text accompanying note 52.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 155-57.
82. I.R.C. §§ 1363(a), 1366 (1987). One exception to the general rule of immunity from
income taxation is that an "S" corporation is liable for the tax imposed as a recapture of an
investment credit that is applied on the premature disposition of an asset for which an investment
credit previously was taken in a year in which the corporation was not an "S" corporation. Id.
§ 1371(d)(2). As a consequence of the repeal of the investment credit by the TRA 1986, this
exception is of diminishing significance and soon will become dead wood.
83. A "C" corporation is any corporation that is not an "S" corporation. An entity becomes
an "S" corporation by virtue of a valid election to have Subchapter S apply to it. Id. § 1361(a)(2).
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become an "S" corporation, in certain circumstances specified types of income
of the resulting "S" corporation still will be taxed to the corporation. Therefore,
even under "S" corporation status, the income may be taxed twice-once to
the "S" corporation itself and once to the shareholders . 4
Not all corporations can qualify for Subchapter S treatment. There are a
number of requirements. To qualify under section 1361, a corporation: (1) Must
be a domestic corporation that is not a member of an affiliated group; (2) must
have no more than thirty-five shareholders none of whom is a nonresident alien
and none of whom is any person other than an individual, the estate of an
individual, or certain (but not all) types of trusts, and; (3) must have only one
class of stock outstanding."5 There are additional requirements, and there are
a number of circumstances in which a Subchapter S election can be terminated
inadvertently .
6
Prior to 1986, the benefits of corporate tax treatment and the relief from
double taxation were of such magnitude that, for many business operations,
there was a tax bias in favor of operating in corporate form. For example,
because of perceived tax advantages of the corporate form, in the 1960s, the
professional service corporation became a popular mode of operation for lawyers
and doctors. 7 One advantage of the corporate form was that there was greater
flexibility and availability of deferred compensation for employee-shareholders
than was available for self employed persons such as partners and sole pro-
prietors. 8 That is no longer true. Also, the corporation typically was taxed at
a lower rate than was imposed on individuals. 89 The difference between the
amount of tax payable by the corporation and that which would have been
payable by the shareholders if the income were earned by them in their capacity
as individuals constituted a deferral. The price of that deferral was a higher
overall tax on distributed corporate income, but in many cases the value of the
deferral exceeded the additional tax cost imposed by the double tax. The burden
of the double tax often could be lightened by arranging the distributions to the
shareholders so that they were taxed at preferential capital gains rates. If the
84. Section 1374 imposes a tax on an "S" corporation for the recognition of "built-in gains."
In essence, a "built-in gain" is a recognized gain of an "S" corporation on the disposition of an
asset to the extent that the gain is attributable to the amount of appreciation of that asset at the
time that the corporation converted from "C" corporation status to an "S" corporation. This
provision applies primarily to gains recognized during the ten-year period following the conversion
of a "C" corporation to an "S" corporation. Id. §§ 1374(a), (c)(l), (d)(3). In certain circumstances,
§ 1375 imposes a tax on an "S" corporation's "passive investment income," but this tax applies
only if the corporation had previously been a "C" corporation and still has earnings and profits
that were earned when it was a "C" corporation. Id. § 1375.
85. Id. § 1361.
86. Id. § 1362(d).
87. See, e.g., Lind, Federal Tax Status of California Professional Men Who Incorporate, 3
U.S.F. L. REV. 201, 201 n.5 (1969); McCluskey, The Professional Corporation Continuum, I SETON
HALL 147, 148 (1970); Comment, Can Professionals Incorporate for Tax Purposes?, 33 ALB. L.
REV. 311, 311-12 (1969).
88. See McCluskey, supra note 87, at 148.
89. For example, as late as 1981, the maximum tax rate applied to an individual taxpayer
was 70%, and the maximum tax rate applicable to a corporate taxpayer was 46%. I.R.C. §§ 1,
11 (1981). Contrast that with the rates that are applicable to 1988, where the maximum rate applied
to an individual taxpayer is 28% (or possibly 3307o) and the maximum rate applicable to a corporate
taxpayer is 34%. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1987).
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distribution was delayed until after the shareholder's death and was then made
as a payment for a stock redemption or as a liquidating distribution, there
might be no additional tax on the receipt of that distribution.
9° The lighter the
double tax burden, the greater was the net benefit of having a deferral of tax
liability because of the lower rates paid by corporate taxpayers.
As a consequence of changes adopted as part of TRA 1986, there will be
fewer, if any, circumstances when there will be a tax advantage to operating a
business as a "C" corporation. To the contrary, the tax burdens imposed on
doing business as a "C" corporation are of such magnitude that there is a
strong incentive to avoid that business form where nontax circumstances permit.
In general, it is not feasible for a large, publicly-held business to operate in
any form other than that of a "C" corporation. However, closely-held businesses
frequently have a choice, and there is reason to believe that tax considerations
will cause such businesses to be conducted as partnerships or, where available,
as "S" corporations. 9' Indeed, many existing small corporations will convert to
partnership or Subchapter S status because of TRA 1986 changes.
92 The rigid
requirements of Subchapter S status will prevent many businesses from making
that election and thus there will be a substantial increase in the number of
businesses conducted in partnership form. Of course, the number of "S" cor-
porations also will rise. For a number of businesses, nontax considerations will
induce them to incorporate and, in many cases, Subchapter S will not be available
so that those business enterprises will have to accept double taxation.
The principal tax changes that have made "C" corporation status undesirable
for small corporations are: (1) The changes made to the tax rate schedules; (2)
the elimination of preferential treatment for net capital gains; and (3) the
elimination of the General Utilities doctrine.
93 For example, if the marginal tax
rate on X corporation's income is thirty-four percent and the marginal tax rate
on B, the sole shareholder of X, is twenty-eight percent, a gain recognized by
X on the sale of an asset, the net proceeds of which (after taxes) are distributed
to B, will bear a tax at a rate of slightly less than 52.5 percent.
94 For convenience,
in this Article, the total rate payable in order to have the corporation's gains
90. Under § 1014, the basis that a shareholder's estate or beneficiary has in the shares of
stock that the shareholder held is equal to the fair market value of those shares at the shareholder's
death (or, in certain circumstances, the fair market value at a date within six months after the
shareholder's death). In a liquidating distribution, or in a stock redemption that is treated as a
purchase, the gain recognized by the shareholder-distributee is the excess of the amount distributed
over the basis that the distributee has in the redeemed or canceled stock. Id. §§ 302(a), 331(a).
Unless the value of the stock has increased significantly between the date of the shareholder's death
and the date on which the redemption or liquidation takes place, there will be little or no gain
recognized by the distributee. In this regard, note that a redemption of stock that was included in
a decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes may qualify for purchase treatment under
§ 303 regardless of whether the redemption otherwise would have been treated as a dividend under
§ 302(d).
91. See Freeman, supra note 56, at 962-67.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The corporation will pay a tax of 34076 and will then distribute the remaining 66070 to
its shareholder, B. B will pay a tax of 2807o on 66% of the proceeds of X's gain that he receives
as a distribution, and that tax equals 18.4807o of the gain recognized on X's disposition of the
asset. The sum of 34076 and 18.4807o is 52.48%.
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placed in the hands of a shareholder will hereafter be rounded off to fifty-two
percent. The fifty-two percent rate payable on business income earned by a "C"
corporation is in sharp contrast to the twenty-eight percent rate that would be
payable if the business is conducted in partnership or sole proprietorship form
or as an "S" corporation. In the past, the twenty-four percentage points dif-
ferential in rates might have been mitigated by the operation of the General
Utilities doctrine and by preferential capital gains rates on liquidating distri-
butions. These relief measures are no longer available.
To the extent that it is feasible to do so, the tax laws should be designed
to have the least possible influence on the decision of the form in which to
conduct a business. 95 Different forms for the conduct of business have been
provided by state laws in order to facilitate the investment of capital and the
conduct of business operations. If the tax laws inadvertently operate to skew
those decisions, they will interfere with state policies and may prove injurious
to the economy. It may well be that prior to 1986, especially for small, closely-
held businesses, the tax laws were skewed in favor of choosing a corporate
form in which to conduct the business, but that does not justify having the
current tax laws discourage the use of the corporate form.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE General Utilities DOCTRINE
A. The Place for General Utilities in the Structure of Subchapter C
In order to determine whether the General Utilities doctrine should have a
place in the post-1986 tax law, it is useful to reflect on the reasons for having
an unintegrated corporate tax. Also, it is helpful to consider the extent to which
those reasons dictate that the unrealized appreciation of a corporate asset that
is distributed out of corporate solution should be taxed twice-once at the
corporate level and once at the shareholder level.
Even those who adopt a conduit view of a corporation support the requirement
that a corporation be required to pay a tax on its current income. If there were
no corporate tax payment, the corporate entity could be used as a device to
defer tax liability until the income was distributed out of corporate solution.
A corporate tax payment is not needed if the "pass-through total integration
system" were adopted, but the administrative costs engendered by that system
are so burdensome that there is no realistic possibility of its adoption. Thus,
for both those who adopt and those who reject the conduit view of a corporate
entity, an important function of the corporate income tax is to prevent the
deferral of tax liability until the earnings are distributed to shareholders. Canada's
Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter Commission) confessed in its study
that it could find "no grounds in principle for taxing corporations, ' 9 6 but the
95. M. NORR, supra note 68, at 55. Norr states that "[f]rom the standpoint of economic
efficiency, then, the tax system should be as nearly neutral as possible in its impact on different
forms of business organization." Id. Norr also states that tax discrimination against the corporate
form has the greatest influence on small businesses because they have an option to choose other
business forms. Id. at 56.
96. CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION, 4 REPORT OF THE ROYAL CoMIlssIoN ON
TAXATION 4 (quoted in M. NORR, supra note 68, at 29).
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Commission recommended the adoption of a corporate tax partly because the
failure to provide a corporate tax "would permit massive and unwarranted
postponement of personal income tax." 97 Some of those who reject the conduit
view prefer that the corporate tax not be integrated. However, as previously
noted, one can be an integrationist without espousing the conduit view. The
principal reason for having an unintegrated corporate tax, other than political
expediency, is that it is a price imposed for the privilege of doing business in
corporate form, which provides several advantages such as limited liability for
the shareholders.
When a corporate asset is distributed to a shareholder, regardless of whether
it is made as a liquidating or a nonliquidating distribution, the shareholder will
have immediate tax consequences. When a distribution under section 301 is made
to a shareholder in respect to stock holdings, the distribution will be considered
ordinary income to the shareholder to the extent that it is made out of the
corporation's earnings and profits. 9 In the situation of liquidating distributions
or distributions in redemption of stock that are treated as a purchase, the
shareholder will recognize a gain to the extent that the amount distributed exceeds
his basis in the redeemed stock. 99
When a distribution in kind is made to an individual shareholder, the income
that is generated thereafter by the distributed asset will not be in corporate
solution and will be taxed to the individual shareholder. There is no potential
for deferral of income because of the intervention of a corporate entity and,
therefore, the imposition of a corporate tax on the distributing corporation
cannot be justified on that ground. Because the subsequent income stream from
the distributed property is neither earned nor received by a corporation, there
is no reason to exact a price for the privilege of earning that amount under
the aegis of the corporate law provisions.
Because of the changes in tax rate schedules that were adopted in 1986,
there is much less reason to fret over the possibility that a corporate entity can
be used to defer the full impact of a tax that would have been imposed if the
income were earned by an individual. The danger of deferral arises only if the
corporate tax rate is lower than the rate applicable to the individual shareholders.
For post-1987 years, a corporation often will have higher tax rates applicable
to it than those that apply to its shareholders. However, for corporations with
97. Id. at 5.
98. I.R.C. § 316(a) (1987). If a dividend is paid to a corporate shareholder, the distributee
may be entitled to a dividend received deduction for a percentage of the dividend. Id. § 243.
However, in such cases, the distributed property remains in corporate solution, and the income
generated by that property will be subject to the unintegrated corporate tax. Moreover, if a dividend
of appreciated property is distributed in kind, the corporate distributee's basis in the distributed
property will equal the basis that the distributing corporation had therein, plus any gain recognized
by the distributing corporation as a consequence of paying the dividend. Id. § 301(d)(2). If General
Utilities were reinstated so that the distributing corporation would recognize gain only in limited
circumstances, there would be a carryover of basis to the distributee corporation.
99. Id. §§ 302(a), 331(a). The circumstances in which gain will not be recognized by a
shareholder because his basis in his redeemed stock is no less than the amount distributed to him
are discussed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 104-06. Also, the circumstances
in which a shareholder incurs no federal tax liability on receiving a distribution because the shareholder
is a tax-exempt entity, or is a foreign person, are discussed later in this article. See infra text
accompanying note 105.
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an annual taxable income of less than $100,000, the tax rate schedules might
favor the corporate entity so that deferral of tax is a possibility.1°° Even in that
circumstance, once the asset is in the hands of a noncorporate shareholder, the
future income stream will be taxed to the shareholder, and will not be protected
by lower tax rates of the corporate entity.
If a liquidating distribution is made in kind to a corporate shareholder,
the subsequent income stream from the distributed property will continue to be
received in corporate solution. However, unless the distributing corporation is
a controlled subsidiary of the distributee, it will be taxed under section 336(a)
on the amount of appreciation of the distributed asset. In addition, the distributee
corporation will recognize a gain-or a predecessor shareholder previously will
have recognized a gain-on its receipt of the distribution. Finally, when the
asset or its proceeds ultimately are distributed to individual shareholders of the
distributee, the individuals-or predecessor shareholders-will incur a personal
income tax liability because of that appreciation. Thus, there will be a triple
tax incidence in such cases. If General Utilities were to apply to prevent the
distributing corporation's recognition of gain, the gain would be subjected to
double taxation-once to the distributee corporation and once to individual
shareholders of the distributee-rather than to the triple tax that is imposed
under existing law.
The price at which an asset is purchased or sold reflects the present value
of the income that the asset will produce over future years. The market price
represents the market's estimate of the future income stream of the asset and
the rate of discount to be used for the risk that the market believes that the
use of the asset presents. In other words, the purchase price of an asset is a
capitalization of the future earnings that it is estimated the asset will produce.
The income stream that is produced by an investment can be divided into
two subparts. The first subpart is a partial recovery of the amount invested.
For example, if a taxpayer invests $100 in the acquisition of an asset that
produces an annual income of $10, a part of the $10 income that the taxpayer
receives in a given year constitutes a recovery of that portion of the taxpayer's
$100 investment that was paid for the right to receive the annual payment for
that year. Obviously, that portion of the income stream should not be taxed.
One means of exempting that portion would be to provide the taxpayer with
a depreciation deduction for a portion of the asset's basis. The depreciation
deduction offsets that amount of the income stream. For convenience, this Article
refers to that portion of an asset's income stream that represents the recovery
of the taxpayer's cost as the "cost recovery income." Because the actual
depreciation deduction that is permitted a taxpayer under the Code for a taxable
year does not necessarily equal the "cost recovery income" for that year, the
100. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. This circumstance likely will occur only
with regard to closely-held corporations with relatively small amounts of taxable income. To some
extent, a small corporation can suppress its taxable income by making deductible payments to its
shareholders for their services or for the leasing of business assets. This technique can keep the
corporation in a lower tax bracket so that deferral of tax liability becomes a possibility. There are
limits on the amount of deductions that can be generated in this fashion, so not every closely-held
corporation will be able to reduce its taxable income to a sufficiently low level to obtain that
benefit.
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depreciation deduction and the "cost recovery income" for a year typically do
not match. The explanation for the disparity lays in the tax policy behind the
determination of depreciation deductions.' 0' For convenience, in the subsequent
discussion in this Article of income stream, the depreciation allowance will be
deemed to equal the cost recovery income.
The portion of the income stream that does not qualify as "cost recovery
income" constitutes the second subpart of an asset's income stream. The cost
of the right to an asset's future income stream is determined by discounting
the total future income to its present value. When a year's income from such
an asset is received, the amount received will be greater than that year's
predetermined income value had been when the asset was purchased by the
taxpayer. In other words, the amount paid by the taxpayer for a year's income,
and consequently the depreciation allowance for that year, will be less than the
actual income received in that year. The difference between the income received
in a year and the depreciation allowance for that year will be taxed. The portion
of a year's income from an investment, designated herein as "second subpart
income," represents the discount used in determining the amount to be paid
for that year's income plus or minus any increase or decrease in the income
stream due to unrealized appreciation or depreciation of the asset that occurred
after the asset was acquired by the taxpayer. For convenience, this Article will
refer to the second subpart of an asset's income stream as the "discount income."
When an investment is made in a nonwasting asset, no depreciation deduction
will be allowed to the taxpayer. The reason that no deduction is allowed rests
on the notion that the depreciation allowance for an asset should represent a
decline in the value of that asset. 0 2 Consequently, all of the income stream
produced by a nonwasting asset will be taxed. The entire income stream from
an investment in a nonwasting asset, therefore, can be described as "discount
income"-assuming that the zero allowance of a depreciation deduction properly
reflects a zero "cost recovery income" amount.
When a taxpayer recognizes a gain on the disposition of an asset and then
reinvests the proceeds from that disposition, the reinvestment will produce an
income stream that can be divided into two parts. Part of the income stream
is the product of investing that portion of the sale proceeds that represented
the taxpayer's basis in the asset. The remaining part of the income stream, the
"appreciation income," is the product of the reinvestment of that portion of
the sale proceeds that represent the gain that the taxpayer realized on the
disposition of the asset. The "appreciation income" produced by the reinvestment
of the proceeds can itself be divided into two subparts-one for the "cost
recovery income" from that portion of the reinvested proceeds and one for the
"discount income" produced by that portion of the reinvested proceeds. The
second subpart of the "appreciation income" is referred to in this Article as
the "discount appreciation income."
If, as previously suggested, an income tax on realized appreciation that is
reinvested can be viewed as a tax on the amount that will be expended on
101. Full consideration of depreciation policies is beyond the scope of this article.
102. See Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring
Net Income?, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 57 (1979) (criticizing the view that tax depreciation should reflect
an asset's decline in value).
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consumption at a future date,'0 3 the tax on an asset's realized gain can be seen
as a tax on the sum of the amount of the asset's appreciation plus the "discount
appreciation income" that is projected for the investment of the proceeds of
that appreciation. In one sense, even when incurred by an individual, the tax
subsequently imposed on the "discount appreciation income" actually produced
by that reinvestment constitutes a double tax. The tax on the gain realized when
an asset is disposed of incorporates a tax on the projected income that will be
produced by the proceeds from that realized gain before they are used for
consumption. Therefore, a tax on the subsequently earned income from the
investment of the proceeds of that realized gain, that is, the "discount appreciation
income," amounts to a second tax on the same item. This tax treatment is
merely an example of the bias created by an income tax system that favors
current consumption over savings. The adverse influence of the tax system on
the decision to save is exacerbated when the realized gain on the disposition of
an asset and the appreciation income therefrom will be received in corporate
solution so that they will be subjected to both a corporate income tax and a
personal income tax.
When a corporation sells an appreciated asset for a gain the corporation
will be taxed on that gain, and the shareholders also will be taxed when the
proceeds of the sale are distributed to them or when they sell their stock. So
long as the proceeds from the disposition of an asset are retained in corporate
solution, the income stream produced by those proceeds will be subjected to
the double taxation that applies to all corporate income. Thus, there will be
double taxation on both the "discount appreciation income" and the gain
recognized on the sale of the first asset. On the other hand, if a corporation
distributes an asset to its shareholder, the subsequent income stream from that
asset will be taxed only once to the shareholder. The double taxation of an
asset's income stream can be avoided by distributing the asset out of corporate
solution. The question posed by the General Utilities doctrine is whether a
distribution also can avoid the double taxation of the capitalized appreciation
income of the asset.
It should be noted that except for the circumstance in which there has been
a step-up in basis at a shareholder's death, any appreciation of the corporation's
assets will be reflected as appreciation of a shareholder's stock.'" The appreciation
of a shareholder's stock will be recognized by the shareholders upon the liquidation
of the corporation or on the shareholder's sale of his stock. Therefore, if a
corporation distributes an appreciated asset to a shareholder, either the shareholder
will recognize a gain thereby, or a predecessor shareholder previously recognized
that gain on a prior sale of the corporation's stock. The exception for a
shareholder who acquired an increased basis at the death of a predecessor
103. See supra text accompanying note 31.
104. Because of other market influences and because of the fact that a minority shareholder
cannot require that corporate distributions be made to shareholders, the amount of income or
appreciation in value of the corporation's assets is not necessarily matched dollar for dollar by an
identical increase in the value of the shareholders' stock. For closely-held corporations in which
the same family owns the controlling interest, the match between the appreciation of the corporation's
net worth and of the value of its shares is likely to be fairly close. In any event, when the
corporation is liquidated, the value of the outstanding stock will equal the net worth of the corporation
less any transactional costs incurred in effecting the liquidation.
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shareholder is merely an aspect of the operation of section 1014-namely, that
unrealized appreciation of a decedent may escape taxation. Similarly, a shareholder
who is a tax-exempt entity or a foreign person will not incur any federal tax
liability, but those exceptions apply to income that is earned directly by such
persons.""
Even if General Utilities remains dead, when the shareholder takes a stepped-
up basis at death or when the shareholder is a tax-exempt entity or foreign
person, there will be only one tax imposed upon the receipt of an appreciated
asset; not the usual double tax. The reinstatement of General Utilities would
reduce the single tax imposition in such cases to a zero tax. In the situation
of the ordinary shareholder, the General Utilities doctrine will reduce what would
have been a double tax incidence to a single tax. There is no meaningful difference
between reducing a single tax to no tax on the one hand and reducing a double
tax to a single tax on the other hand. In either event, the doctrine prevents
the imposition of a corporate tax on the unrealized appreciation of a distributed
asset.
Where a shareholder is not taxed on a distribution, it is attributable to tax
policies that operate independently of the question of what is the proper tax
base against which to apply the corporate tax. It is worth noting that the General
Utilities doctrine operates primarily, and perhaps almost exclusively, on closely-
held corporations.'06 It seems unlikely that many shareholders of closely-held,
family corporations are foreign persons or tax-exempt shareholders.
When a corporation distributes an appreciated asset to a shareholder, current
law requires the corporation to recognize gain. As explained earlier, that gain
typically will be taxed both to the corporation and to the shareholder (or to a
predecessor shareholder). 0 7 The future income stream, which the gain represents,
will be taxed to the shareholder and will escape double taxation. Prior to the
distribution, the corporation was taxed on the income produced by the asset,
but was not taxed on the unrealized appreciation of the asset. A question remains
as to whether the corporation should be taxed on the capitalization of the future
income stream that will be received by the shareholders when the corporation
has not received the value of that appreciation as some form of payment.'08
The General Utilities doctrine prevented the recognition of gain by the corporation
and taxed the appreciation of the asset only once-to the shareholder when the
distribution was received (or to a previous shareholder who sold the stock). By
105. Nolan, supra note 14, at 103.
106. See id. at 101.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06. Exceptions to this rule arise where the
shareholder's basis in his stock has been stepped-up under I.R.C. § 1014 (1987) and where the
shareholder is either a foreign or a tax-exempt person.
108. In a liquidation or stock redemption, the corporation either receives or is deemed to
have constructively received its own stock in exchange for the distribution, but the acquired stock
has no value to the corporation, especially when received in connection with a complete liquidation
of the corporation. Regardless of whether the actual or constructive receipt of its own stock is a
significant enough event to satisfy the minimal requirements of realization, a policy issue remains.
The unanswered question is whether it comports with good tax policy to require the corporation
to recognize an otherwise unrealized gain. This question is independent of the inquiry into whether
the possible constitutionally mandated realization requirement has been satisfied. In no sense has
the appreciation been severed from the asset in a manner beneficial to the corporation.
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repealing General Utilities, Congress has required that the unrealized appreciation
be taxed twice and has permitted the subsequent income stream to be taxed
only once.
It is reasonable to allow the future income stream to be taxed only once
to the shareholder because the removal of the asset from corporate solution
eliminates any prospect of using the corporate entity as a shielding device to
defer a shareholder's tax liability. The justification for subjecting the unrealized
appreciation of the distributed asset, which appreciation represents a capitalization
of the income stream to be enjoyed by the shareholder, to double taxation is
not apparent. Similar considerations to those that permit the removal of the
future income stream from double taxation suggest that the unrealized capitalization
of that income stream also should escape double taxation. The pragmatic
considerations that underlie the adoption of a double tax system for corporate
income are considerably less compelling when applied to unrealized appreciation.
If a corporate distribution to its shareholder is deemed analogous to an
individual's expenditure for consumption," 9 a conceptual justification for taxing
the corporation on the amount of appreciation of the distributed asset may
exist. Under the conduit view of a corporation, the analogy between a corporation's
distribution and an individual's consumption is invalid. The distribution of
corporate assets to a shareholder, who is the beneficial owner of the asset under
the conduit view, is not related to the consumption enjoyed by an individual.
Even if the conduit view is rejected, the analogy to consumption is strained.
When an individual puts an appreciated asset into a corporation by way
of a contribution to capital or a transfer to a controlled corporation in exchange
for stock, the unrealized appreciation then becomes subject to the normal
corporate taxation rules including the double tax incidence. The transferor
recognizes neither a gain nor a loss in the transfer, even if the exchange is for
stock. ' 0 The corporation's basis in the asset equals the basis that the transferor
had, and the transferor's basis in the corporate stock received in the exchange
is the same as his basis in the asset that he transferred."' Thus, the appreciation,
which arose in the hands of the individual shareholder, becomes taxable both
to the corporation and to the shareholder. Rather than separate the appreciation
that arose in the shareholder's hands from appreciation that arose in the
corporation's hands, the tax law combines them. Because the income produced
by the contributed asset will be received in corporate solution and will be
subjected to double taxation, the unrealized capitalization of that future income
stream also will be subjected to double taxation. The price of contributing
appreciated property to a corporation is the imposition of double taxation thereon.
Similarly, if an individual contributes a depreciated asset to a controlled
corporation in exchange for stock, there can be a double allowance for the loss
recognized on that depreciated element. The corporation takes the same basis
in the contributed asset as the shareholder, and the corporation will recognize
109. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 396 (1983).
I10. I.R.C. § 351 (1987).
111. Id. §§ 358(a), 362(a).
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a loss on the disposition of the depreciated asset.11 2 The stock that the shareholder
acquired in exchange will have the same basis that the shareholder had in the
contributed asset, and the stock will also be a depreciated asset. If the shareholder
sells that stock, he will recognize a loss. The tax law accepts the double allowance
of a loss as the price of adhering to the double tax scheme once an asset is
in corporate solution.
The General Utilities provision for single taxation of appreciation on an
asset distributed by a corporation to its shareholders is consistent with the
treatment of assets contributed to a corporation. In either case, the appreciation
treatment would depend upon the distributee of the asset, who is the party that
will realize the income stream, rather than upon the distributor. Of course,
parallel treatment is not always provided by the tax law. But, in the absence
of a good reason for different treatment, parallel treatment has visceral appeal.
The current law's rejection of General Utilities is incompatible with the treatment
accorded to contributions to corporations, and no good reason is apparent for
this inconsistency. Indeed, in that regard, it is noteworthy that where a depreciated
asset is distributed to a shareholder, Congress is ambivalent about allowing the
corporation to recognize a loss." '3
One negative consequence of requiring a corporation to recognize a gain
on the distribution of an appreciated asset is that the recognition will cause tax
consequences at a time when the gain, which -would make funds available to
pay the tax, has not been severed from the asset. That objection could be met
by allowing the nonrecognition of such gain subject to the distributee's taking
a carryover basis in the distributed asset-that is, the distributee's basis in the
asset would be the same as the basis that the corporation had. There is reason
to believe that the Treasury Department is contemplating a proposal to amend
the Code to provide some type of nonrecognition and carryover basis. While
that meets the objection of imposing a tax liability before the gain is severed,
112. To prevent the "stuffing" of depreciated assets in a corporation that is about to liquidate
in order to obtain a double loss allowance, the corporation will be denied a deduction for a loss
that is attributable to the amount of depreciation of an asset that was contributed to the corporation
for the principal purpose of having the corporation recognize the loss in connection with its liquidation.
Id. § 336(d)(2). This disallowance of a deduction applies only if the transferor had a prohibited
purpose for transferring the asset to the corporation. The asset must have been transferred to the
corporation as a contribution to capital or as part of a § 351 exchange for stocks and securities
of the corporation. Id. If the asset was contributed more than two years prior to the date on which
the corporation adopted its plan of liquidation, the loss almost certainly would be allowed because
it would be difficult to prove that the transfer was made for a prohibited purpose. Blue Book,
supra note 16, at 343. A loss deduction also is denied for certain liquidating distributions of
depreciated property, I.R.C. § 336(d)(1) (1987), but that provision can easily be avoided by selling
the property and distributing the proceeds or by distributing the property only to shareholders who
(after applying attribution rules) own less than 50%, in value, of the corporation's outstanding
stock. It is noteworthy that in its Final Report on Subchapter C, the staff of the Senate Finance
Committee proposed an amendment to § 358(a)(2) so that when a depreciated asset is contributed
to a corporation, the corporation's basis in that asset would be limited to its fair market value.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. OF FINANCE, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., FINAL REPORT ON THE SUBCHAPTER
C REVISION ACT OF 1985 220 (Comm. Print 1985). The proposal was not adopted.
113. No loss is recognized to a corporation making a nonliquidating distribution of depreciated
property. I.R.C. § 311(a) (1987). A loss is recognized to a corporation on making a liquidating
distribution of depreciated property, but there are several exceptions denying the recognition of the
loss in certain circumstances. See id. §§ 336(a), (d).
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it continues the policy of subjecting the unrealized appreciation to a double tax.
The shareholder will be taxed on the appreciation of his stock when he receives
the distribution of the appreciated asset, or a predecessor shareholder previously
will have recognized the gain as a consequence of a sale of the corporation's
stock, and the shareholder-distributee will be taxed a second time when he
disposes of the distributed asset. The principal issue is whether double taxation
is proper for such unrealized gain. Only if the answer is affirmative does the
question of the timing of recognition become an issue.
One objection to the General Utilities doctrine is that it permits the step-
up in basis of a corporation's appreciated asset even though the gain will be
subjected to only a single tax."14 So long as the income stream from the asset
or the investment of the proceeds from the sale of the asset is in the hands of
an individual, this article suggests that there is a conceptual basis for imposing
only one tax." 5 However, what if the individual shareholder contributes the
asset or proceeds from its sale to another corporation? The subsequent income
stream from the asset or the proceeds will be in corporate solution and thereby
will be insulated from the tax schedule for individuals. If the second corporation
is in a lower tax bracket than the individual, the potential for deferral has not
been eliminated. The price for this deferral is that the taxable income from the
income stream of the second corporation will be subjected to double taxation
when distributed to the shareholder. In addition, there is a doctrine of long
standing that addresses this problem. If a shareholder contributes the assets that
he received as part of a liquidating distribution to a second corporation, the
transaction may be recharacterized as a reorganization or as a reincorporation."
6
While that doctrine is not always invoked successfully, it is a substantial restraint
on the use of liquidations as a device to step-up the basis of assets. The doctrine
also is the main line of defense against the use of a liquidation as a device to
terminate undesirable tax attributes of a corporation such as its accumulated
earnings and profits. In light of the double taxation of the second corporation's
income, the question of whether the reincorporation doctrine will be applied to
such transactions is of small consequence to the tax policy issue.
Several commentators have disputed the contention that General Utilities
serves as a useful escape valve from the failure of Congress to integrate corporate
and personal income taxes. For example, prior to TRA 1986, Professor Wolfman
decried the value of General Utilities as a partial integration system." 7 Professor
Wolfman asks:
Is our present [General Utilities] system anything like the partial
integration system we would want if we set out to create one? We
have opportunities for some corporations some of the time to avoid
the corporate tax while others are never able to do so. Can one call
that a 'system' of partial integration or anything else? " 8
114. See Wolfman, Whither "C"?, 39 TAx NOTES 1269, 1279 (1988); Yin, General Utilities
Repeal: Is Tax Reform Really Going to Pass It By?, 31 TAx NT.Es 1111, 1114 (1986).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 107-13.
116. See D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 1, at 378-91.
117. Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of the
General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIGO L. REv. 81, 85 (1985).
118. Id.
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Professor Yin adopted the same objection to this doctrine." 9
The attack by Wolfman and Yin on the doctrine suggests that it operates
arbitrarily so that there is no more reason to provide relief from nonintegration
for distributed appreciated assets than there is for gain recognized during the
life span of a corporation. Contrary to that suggestion, as noted above, there
is a conceptual basis for not requiring the double taxation of unrealized appreciation
of an asset that is distributed out of corporate solution, especially if it is a
liquidating distribution. That is not to say that a conceptual justification for
the General Utilities doctrine is a sufficient reason to reinstate the doctrine. The
value of the doctrine must be measured by balancing the benefits that it provides
against the costs that it imposes. This Article discusses those benefits and costs
below. 20 Before doing so, the view advanced by Wolfman and Yin deserves
further comment.'
2'
Assuming that tax policy favors integration and that an unintegrated tax
system is the product of political expediency, then any partial integration system
necessarily will provide only incomplete relief. Incomplete relief will have an
arbitrary aspect in that it does not help those persons who do not qualify for
it. The inequity in such circumstances does not stem from the fact that some
relief is provided. Rather, it stems from the fact that the problem at which the
partial relief was aimed has not been eliminated completely. Given that Congress
is not ready to move to an integrated system, the question is whether there are
conceptual and economic considerations that make the imposition of a double
tax on distributed unrealized appreciation even more inappropriate than is the
imposition on recognized corporate income. Criticizing a relief measure because
it does not go as far as it might is not helpful. The issue is the age-old one
of whether half a loaf is worse than none. There is no universal answer to that
question. The merits and costs of each measure must be examined and weighed.
The unintegrated corporate tax is the price that the federal government
exacts for the privilege of doing business in corporate form. It is far from
obvious that the purpose and integrity of that unintegrated tax dictate that it
be extended to reach the unrealized appreciation of a distributed asset. The
proponents of the repeal of General Utilities begin with a presumption that the
tax should be extended and, therefore, place the burden of persuasion on those
who favor the doctrine. There is no compelling reason for imposing the burden
of persuasion on those who support the doctrine rather than on those who favor
its repeal. Regardless of where the burden rests, the case for the reinstatement
of the General Utilities doctrine is a strong one.
It should be noted that the General Utilities doctrine deals with the type
of action taken by a corporation rather than with the type of corporation.
Under that doctrine, any corporation that has an asset with unrealized appreciation
can avoid double taxation of that appreciation by distributing the asset to its
shareholders or by liquidating. There are many circumstances in which a corporation
will not be willing to take either of those actions and so will not qualify for
119. Yin, supra note 114, at 1114.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 122-52.
121. Apparently, neither Professor Wolfman nor Professor Yin favors integration. Their con-
tention is that even if one is an integrationist, a case cannot be made for the General Utilities
doctrine. It is that contention that this Article wishes to address.
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the relief. While that is regrettable, the cause of the difference in tax treatment
is at least as much due to the failure of Congress to integrate corporate and
personal taxes as it is to the integration of the tax burden on distributed unrealized
appreciation.
B. The Benefits and Costs of Reinstating All or a Portion of the General
Utilities Doctrine
The author believes that the above analysis of the conceptual framework
of the unintegrated tax system strongly suggests that the General Utilities doctrine
should be reintroduced to Subchapter C of the Code. The case for the inclusion
of the General Utilities doctrine is strongest if the conduit view of corporations
is adopted. As noted below, virtually only closely-held corporations distribute
appreciated assets to their shareholders, other than distributions made pursuant
to a reorganization or corporate division to which the General Utilities doctrine
has no application. 122 Even critics of the conduit view concede that it is an
accurate description of closely-held corporations.1 23 Consequently, a conceptual
analysis strongly favors the adoption of the General Utilities doctrine. However,
the substantial national deficit suggests it is unlikely that Congress will be
persuaded on the basis of a conceptual analysis, regardless of its strength. The
likelihood that General Utilities will be reinstated rests ultimately on cost-benefit
considerations rather than on a conceptual analysis.
The most important benefits a reinstatement of the General Utilities doctrine
would provide are a decrease in the tax bias against those businesses choosing
to operate as "C" corporations and a reduction in the discriminatory treatment
of those businesses that are compelled to operate in the "C" corporate form.
If the doctrine were readopted and limited to liquidating distributions, the relief
would benefit primarily closely-held corporations because very few publicly-held
corporations are liquidated. 24 In the author's view, even if the doctrine were
made applicable to dividends and other nonliquidating distributions, closely-held
corporations would be the principal beneficiaries of the measure since publicly-
held corporations rarely make distributions of property in kind, other than
distributions that are excluded from income recognition by the reorganization
or corporate division provisions.125 Tax relief is most important for the closely-
held corporation because it is primarily closely-held businesses that have the
option to choose a partnership form for the conduct of the business. The relief
from an unintegrated tax will reduce the extent to which tax considerations will
govern the choice of business form.
122. See infra text accompanying note 124.
123. See sources cited infra note 124; see also M. NoRu, supra note 68, at 9-13, 35 (noting
that widely-held corporations are sufficiently different from closely-held ones that a single tax system
for both does not operate well).
124. See Nolan, supra note 14, at 101. Professor Yin has questioned the accuracy of the
above statement because of reports that a few publicly-held corporations sought relief from the
repeal of General Utilities. Yin, supra note 114, at 1118 n.72.
125. The nonrecognition provisions that apply to qualified corporate distributions are set forth
in §§ 311(a), 336(c). I.R.C. §§ 311(a), 336(c) (1987); see also id. §§ 355, 361 (providing for
nonrecognition for certain distributions of stock and securities of a controlled corporation and for
any gain or loss to the transferor corporation). These nonrecognition rules will apply regardless of
whether General Utilities is reinstated.
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This Article suggests that it would be undesirable to target only closely-
held corporations for a legislatively adopted provision for nonrecognition of a
corporation's unrealized gain on a distribution. There are conceptual and economic
grounds for not taxing such gain to publicly-held corporations, although the
case is not as strong as is the case for closely-held corporations. In addition,
any division between publicly-held and closely-held corporations will be based
on the drawing of an arbitrary line, and regardless of where the line is placed
there will be some corporations that fail to qualify for General Utilities treatment
and yet fit within the class of enterprises at which the relief is aimed. For
example, if a closely-held corporation was defined as one with fewer than thirty-
six shareholders, it is easy to conceive of corporations with thirty-six shareholders
for which a partnership form is a viable option.
Bright line drawing necessarily causes some arbitrary impact. Such line
drawing, however, is employed in the Code in order to obtain the benefits of
a provision that is easy to administer and predictable in application with some
degree of certainty.' 2 6 In this case, there is little justification for bright line
drawing because there are not likely to be many publicly-held corporations that
would benefit from this relief, and there are reasonably strong reasons to cover
those few publicly-held corporations that would benefit from such relief. In any
event, legislative and administrative complications caused by such line drawing,1
2 7
the likelihood that making such a differentiation will preclude relief to corporations
that fall within what should be the protected class, and the fact that there are
few, if any, corporations that make distributions of appreciated property that
should be excluded from the relief provision combine to make it undesirable
to limit the relief provision to corporations of less than a specified size.
Some of the critics of the General Utilities doctrine have questioned why,
if partial integration relief is desirable, the relief should be aimed solely at
liquidating distributions.' 28 Why should not the relief be granted as a subsidy
to the corporation during its existence or granted in the form of lower corporate
tax rates? 29 Why favor dead corporations and deny relief to those that are
thriving? These questions were raised before the General Utilities doctrine had
been repudiated and after the doctrine essentially had been restricted to liquidating
distributions. Later, this Article will address the question of whether the doctrine
should be limited to liquidating distributions. 30 If not, no doubt the same
126. For example, for a corporation to qualify for a Subchapter S election, it must have
fewer than 36 shareholders. Id. § 1361(b)(1)(A).
127. If the number of shareholders is to be restricted, rules will have to be adopted for dealing
with stock held by other entities and for stock held by spouses or by other family members. While
a variety of such rules have been adopted in other areas of the Code, they add complex provisions
to the statute and have caused interpretive problems. Different rules of this type have been fashioned
for various provisions in order to deal with the disparate goals of the several provisions to which
they apply. For example, in the Subchapter S provision, spouses are counted as a single person,
and most types of trusts are prohibited from holding stock if the corporation is to qualify as an
"S" corporation. Id. §§ 1361(b)(l)(B), (c)(1). A different approach with respect to trusts would
have to be designed for the General Utilities provision, and the one-shareholder rule might be
expanded to cover certain other members of a family.
128. Wolfman, supra note 117, at 85; Yin, supra note 114, at 1119.
129. Yin, supra note 114, at 1119.
130. Sce infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
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objections that have been made to the treatment of liquidating distributions will
be made to nonliquidating distributions of property in kind. Let us first consider
these issues as they relate to liquidations.'
It is unlikely that the subsidization of operating corporations, even small
ones, is politically feasible. Certain small operating corporations are, arguably,
subsidized by applying lower corporate tax rates to the first $75,000 of their
taxable income, but the public does not regard the lower rates as a subsidy.
While the TRA 1986 lowered corporate tax rates, the Act also lowered the tax
rates on individuals. As a result, corporate rates typically are higher than
individual rates. This disparity of rates, greatly aggravated by double taxation
of corporate income, is one of the features that tilts the choice of business
form away from "C" corporations.
On the other hand, the elimination of a corporate tax on unrealized
appreciation is more saleable politically. There are conceptual grounds for excluding
unrealized appreciation. Many people have a favorable visceral reaction to such
an exclusion because it comports with general tax policy regarding realization.
The problem that General Utilities addresses is that the prospect of incurring
double taxation deters investments in corporate form. This deterrence is analogous
to the tax bias that operates on savings, rather than consumption.3 2 The bias
against savings arises because of the double taxation of income earned from
the investment of savings.' This treatment operates to deter capital investments
and favor consumption.
For many years prior to the adoption of TRA 1986, the tax law mitigated
the bias against capital investments by providing preferential tax rates for capital
gains. 34 The benefit of those preferential rates was not enjoyed until the asset
was sold or exchanged. The investor understood that if the net amount retained
on liquidation of the investment was increased, the expected return on the
investment was higher. The mitigation of the tax bite imposed upon liquidation
of the investment was of current benefit to an investor because it made the
investment more marketable. The resale value of a new asset often affects the
price of the asset. A new car that is a brand of automobile that has a good
used market record will sell for more than otherwise would be the case.
An investor who is considering whether to operate a business in corporate
form will wish to take into account the net amount of after-tax return that can
be projected for the enterprise. The imposition of a tax on unrealized appreciation
on the liquidation of a corporation is one of several tax deterrents to operating
in that form. The sum of these tax deterrents has to be balanced against any
nontax benefits that can be obtained. If one of the major tax deterrents is
removed, the value of nontax benefits that need to be present to justify doing
131. This Article subsequently will consider nonliquidating distributions. See infra text accom-
panying notes 158-60.
132. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. While TRA 1986 eliminated preferential rates for net capital gains, the Act provides for
a reintroduction of that preference if the normal tax rates should rise at a subsequent date. I.R.C.
§§ 1(j), 1201(a) (1987).
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business in corporate form is reduced. It is true that the adoption of the General
Utilities doctrine will not eliminate the tax bias against incorporating, but it will
mitigate the tax bias. In view of 1) the conceptual justification for that doctrine
and 2) the political reality that an alternative form of relief from the tax bias
is unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable future, there is considerable merit
to reinstating the doctrine. The targeting of corporate liquidations-and possibly
of current nonliquidating distributions in kind-for relief is no less reasonable
than was the preferential rate for capital gains, albeit the conceptual grounds
for those two relief measures differ in some respects.
The exclusion of unrealized appreciation from double taxation does
discriminate against corporations that sell their appreciated assets and thereby
realize the appreciation. This discrimination, however, is inherent in the realization
doctrine. If X corporation purchases a widget for $10 and if the widget subsequently
appreciates in value to $15 because of an increase in income produced by it,
X will not be taxed on that appreciation so long as X does not sell the widget.
If X sells the widget for $15 and invests the proceeds in a gidget that produces
the same income stream as did the widget, X will be taxed on the $5 of
appreciation that he realized on the sale of the widget. This discrimination has
long been a part of the tax law and has not seriously been attacked.
The determination that unrealized appreciation of a corporate asset should
be treated differently from realized appreciation so that the former will be taxed
only once and, therefore, will escape double taxation is hardly a revolutionary
concept. The issues are whether the structure of Subchapter C of the Code
would be abused by failing to apply the corporate tax to that appreciation and
whether there is an economic justification for doing so. This Article has endeavored
to demonstrate that the exclusion of unrealized appreciation from the corporate
tax is more consistent with the structure of Subchapter C than the double
taxation of that appreciation. The author also believes that there are economic
justifications to provide some relief from the unintegrated tax system.
Many tax commentators regard the realization doctrine as an inconvenient
nuisance that interferes with the income tax system's capacity to measure annual
income accurately. For them, realization should take place at the earliest date
that it is convenient to measure it. Understandably, one who holds that view
would reject the General Utilities doctrine that permits a corporation to escape
corporate taxation of the appreciation of an asset that took place in its hands.
135
Although it will not always be so, the appreciation of an asset that is held by
a corporation typically will be attributable to appreciation that occurred while
the corporation-or a predecessor corporation-held the asset. The undesirability
of imposing a corporate tax on such unrealized appreciation rests more on a
desire to limit the scope of the double tax system that applies to corporate
income than it does to the sanctity of the realization doctrine. If, as this Article
suggests, whatever pragmatic justification there may be for an unintegrated
corporate tax does not exist once the income-producing asset is removed from
corporate solution, then there is no reason to take extraordinary measures to
accelerate the realization of appreciation so that it can be taxed twice.
135. See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 117; Yin, supra note 114.
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It is interesting to note that when shareholders are contemplating the cash
sale of an incorporated business, the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
creates a tax bias in favor of selling the corporation's stock rather than having
the corporation sell its assets followed by a liquidation of the corporation. The
reason that the double tax system creates that bias is because of the time value
of money.
Consider a proposed sale of a corporate business to a publicly-held "C"
corporation in the circumstance in which the General Utilities doctrine has been
repealed and in which there are assets in the target corporation that are appreciated
in value. Further, assume that the target corporation and the purchasing corporation
are in the thirty-four percent tax bracket-the maximum rate applicable to
corporations. 3 6 Finally, assume that the shareholders of the target plan to take
cash out of the sale-that is, if the target's assets are sold, the target will be
liquidated-and that the purchasing "C" corporation intends to retain the target's
assets for some years. At first blush, the rule requiring the double taxation of
unrealized appreciation appears to make it irrelevant whether the target sells its
assets, thereby recognizing income for its unrealized appreciation, and promptly
liquidates or whether the shareholders of the target sell their stock so that the
basis of the target's assets remain unchanged and the purchasing corporation
will incur the same tax liability either as a recognition of gain when the target
disposes of the appreciated assets or in the form of reduced depreciation if the
assets are retained and are depreciable.
For example, assume that the target corporation holds a nondepreciable
asset with a fair market value of $400,000 and the target has a basis of $0 in
the asset. If the target sells the asset for its value, it will recognize a gain of
$400,000 on which the corporate tax, at a rate of thirty-four percent, will be
$136,000. That will leave a net of $264,000 for the corporation to distribute to
its shareholders as a liquidating distribution. The shareholders will receive $264,000
in liquidation of the target, and they will pay tax on the gain they recognize
from that distribution. If the purchasing corporation subsequently sells the asset
for $400,000, it will not recognize a gain because it will have a basis of $400,000
in the asset.
On the other hand, if the purchasing corporation buys the target's stock,
it will incur a tax on a $400,000 gain if the target subsequently disposes of the
asset at that price.137 The tax on that gain at a thirty-four percent rate will be
$136,000, and the target (and therefore the purchasing corporation) will net only
$264,000 from the sale. It might seem that the purchasing corporation would
pay only $264,000 for the number of shares of the target's stock that is attributable
to the $400,000 asset because that is all that the purchasing corporation can
net from the sale of that asset. However, the $136,000 potential tax liability
does not have a cost of that same amount to the purchasing corporation. The
136. I.R.C. § 11(b) (1987).
137. When the purchasing corporation buys the stock of the target, the target's basis in its
assets will be unchanged unless an election is made under § 338 to treat the target as if it had
sold all of its assets and recognized the gain on any appreciation thereon. If the target recognizes
a gain on a subsequent disposition or on a § 338 election, the tax payable by the target will reduce
the value of its stock that is held by the purchasing corporation. Thus, the incidence of the tax
on the target will fall upon the purchasing corporation.
1988]
HeinOnline  -- 13 J. Corp. L. 989 1987-1988
The Journal of Corporation Law
tax liability will not be incurred by the purchasing corporation until that future
date on which the disposition of the asset is made. The present value of a
liability payable at what might be a distant future date is less than the amount
of dollars payable when the liability accrues. The purchasing corporation, therefore,
should be willing to pay more for the target's stock than the $264,000 that the
shareholders would net if they had the target sell its assets to the purchasing
corporation for $400,000. In other words, if the target corporation sells the
asset to the purchasing corporation and then liquidates, the corporate tax liability
for the asset's appreciation will be payable currently. But, if the target's stock
is sold, the corporate tax liability will not be payable for some years and the
deferral has substantial value. Thus, when the asset is nondepreciable, there is
a tax-created bias in favor of having the shareholders of the target sell their
stock.
What if the $400,000 asset is depreciable? The sale of the target's stock
will leave the target with a zero basis and so it will provide no depreciation
allowance against the income stream produced by the asset. In contrast, if the
assets of the target are sold, the purchasing corporation would have a $400,000
basis to depreciate over the recovery period of the asset. Because the depreciation
deductions will be spread over the recovery period of the asset, the present
value of the aggregate tax reduction obtained from such deductions is less than
the tax that would be paid by the target if it sold the asset directly to the
purchaser.
As a consequence of the manner in which depreciation deductions for certain
assets are determined, the discrepancy between the tax treatments of asset sales
and stock sales is greatly enhanced. The present value of a depreciation deduction
decreases as the amount of time before the deduction can be taken increases.
Therefore, the more accelerated a method of depreciation,' the less will be the
difference between the amount of tax payable by the target on a sale of its
assets and the present value of the projected tax loss that will be suffered by
the purchasing corporation if instead it buys the target's stock. Many types of
depreciable assets cannot be depreciated on an accelerated method. Under the
current tax law, accelerated depreciation is available generally for tangible personal
properties, but it is not available for most improved realty or for intangible
properties. 13 9
To illustrate the operation of the bias where depreciable property is concerned,
consider the earlier example of a target that holds an asset with a market value
of $400,000 and a basis of zero. Assume that the asset is a nonresidential
building on leased land, which must be depreciated on a straight-line basis over
a recovery period of thirty-one and a half years. 4° Assuming that the asset
would be purchased by the purchaser on January 1, the annual rate of depreciation
for the asset is a little more than three percent. 4' Further, assume that the
138. An accelerated method of depreciation is a depreciation method in which the depreciable
basis of an asset is allocated among the years of its recovery period so that a greater proportion
of the total amount of depreciation for the asset's life is allocated to the earlier years of the asset's
life than is allocated to its later years
139. I.R.C. § 168 (1987).
140. Id. §§ 168(b)(3), (c).
141. See Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-42 I.R.B. 17, 32.
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$400,000 building produces an annual net income of $40,000. The building,
therefore, was valued by capitalizing its annual income by a factor of ten.
If the purchasing corporation buys the building from the target for the
market price, it will have a basis of $400,000 in the building. Each year, the
purchaser will receive net income of $40,000 and it will deduct depreciation of
about $12,000.142 The purchaser will report net taxable income of $28,000 on
which it will pay a tax of $9520.'14 Therefore, after taxes, the purchaser will
net $30,480.'" Because the purchaser is willing to pay $400,000 for an after-
tax return of $30,480, a capitalization factor of more than thirteen is realized
for the after-tax income from the building.
145
If, instead, the purchasing corporation was to buy the target's stock and
does not utilize section 338 to cause the recognition of the unrealized appreciation
of the building, it will be taxed on the full $40,000 of annual net income that
it receives because it will not have any depreciation allowance. Note that the
purchasing corporation can obtain the target's income without incurring an
additional tax by either: (1) Filing a consolidated return with the target, or (2)
having the target distribute its net income as a dividend for which a one hundred
percent dividend received deduction is available under section 243(a)(3), or (3)
liquidating the target under section 332. The tax payable on $40,000 of income
at a thirty-four percent rate is $13,600. Thus, the purchaser will net after taxes
only $26,400. This net after-tax figure is $4080 less than the purchaser would
receive if it purchased the building directly. Obviously, the corporation will not
pay $400,000 for the target's stock since it will net a smaller after-tax amount
than it would obtain if it bought the building directly for $400,000. The question
is, how much less than $400,000 will it pay? If the purchaser will pay more
than $264,000 for the stock, the shareholders are better off to sell the stock
than they would be if the target sold the building.
Returning to the net income after taxes that the purchasing corporation
would receive if it purchased the building directly from the target, recall that
the purchaser would net $30,480 annually and that, using that net income figure,
a capitalization factor of thirteen yields the purchase price of $400,000. It would
seem reasonable then to use a capitalization factor of thirteen to determine how
much the purchasing corporation would pay for the target's stock. Because, in
that event, the building would produce after-tax annual income of $26,400, a
capitalization factor of thirteen will justify a purchase price of $343,200. If so,
that provides a substantial profit for the shareholders to sell the target's stock
rather than to have the target sell the building directly. In fact, it is likely that
the purchase price for the target's stock will be somewhere between $264,000
and $343,200, but it should be closer to the latter figure than the former.
This bias for a stock sale occurs because the present value of the additional
tax liability that will be incurred by the purchaser in subsequent years as a
result of the loss of depreciation deductions that would have been allowed in
those years if an asset sale had taken place is less than the aggregate amount
142. $400,000 X 3%
143. $28,000 X 3407o. Recall that both the purchasing corporation and the target are in the
34% tax bracket.
144. $40,000 - $9520.
145. $30,480 X 13.12 = $400,000.
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of such increases in tax liability. The greater the acceleration permitted for
depreciation deductions, the less the bias will be.146
The tax law does provide significant acceleration for the depreciation of
tangible personal properties. Only straight-line depreciation, however, is allowable
for most improved realty and for intangible assets. 147 Especially in those
circumstances in which a target's realty and intangible assets predominate, there
will be a strong tax bias for selling the target's stock. Also, the bias operates
on nondepreciable assets of the target and is especially strong in the case of a
nondepreciable asset, such as the goodwill of the business, that may never be
disposed of by the purchasing corporation because the purchaser may not place
much value on the basis that it can acquire in such an asset by purchasing it
directly.
One objection to permitting a lower tax rate for selling a target's stock is
that it creates a difference in tax treatment for one method of conducting a
sale when the distinction between the alternative methods of sale is merely a
formal one. This creates a trap for the unwary taxpayer who chooses one method
without knowing the tax consequences. The Code already contains a multitude
of such traps, but it cannot be regarded as desirable to expand them. A second
objection is that financial and economic considerations point towards a preference
for selling the corporation's assets rather than a stock sale. In an asset sale,
the purchaser knows what liabilities he has undertaken. In contrast, in a stock
sale, the purchaser may become liable for undisclosed or latent liabilities. An
asset purchase, therefore, may be more efficient. It is undesirable to have the
tax system nudge the transaction towards a stock sale.
If a target were not required to recognize gain on a liquidating sale or
distribution of its assets, there would be no difference in the tax consequences
of selling the target's assets or of selling the target's stock. With a few exceptions
(e.g., the income recognition required for recapture of depreciation and for
LIFO recapture), that was the case before the TRA 1986 eliminated most of
the General Utilities doctrine. So, the tax bias favoring the sale of stock arose
primarily as a consequence of the 1986 Act.
One means of preventing the repeal of General Utilities from creating a
tax bias is to require that the target recognize gain for any unrealized appreciation
when a certain percentage of its stock is sold. This could be accomplished by
making section 338 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 mandatory instead
of elective. That seems a drastic solution to a problem that is generated by the
repeal of a rule that should never have been repudiated. If it is necessary to
make section 338 mandatory in order to cure one of the flaws in the repeal of
General Utilities, there is not much left to the claim, noted below, that the
repeal will simplify the Code.
Professor James B. Lewis recently has proposed the adoption of a system
called Uniform Corporate-Level Recognition (UCLR) that would require a target
to recognize gain on its asset appreciation when a certain percentage of its
146. The fact that in such cases there will be less depreciation allowable for the later years
of the asset's life will not offset the allowance of a greater amount of depreciation in the early
years. This is so because of the time value of money.
147. I.R.C. § 168 (1987).
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outstanding stock is sold. 48 If adopted, the UCLR system would introduce at
least as much complexity as section 338 raised and very likely would cause even
greater complexity than section 338 did.149
A major cost of the General Utilities doctrine is that it is the source of
some complex provisions in the tax law that are designed to prevent the abusive
use of that doctrine to obtain a tax windfall. The reincorporation doctrine and
the collapsible corporation provision are two illustrations of such complex provisions
that have been mentioned by opponents of General Utilities. 50 Unfortunately,
TRA 1986's elimination of the General Utilities doctrine has not yet led to
wholesale abandonment of the many complex provisions that deal at least partially
with that doctrine. One reason for this is that many of those complex provisions
are not directed exclusively at General Utilities. The reincorporation doctrine,
for example, also prevents the use of a liquidation to terminate unfavorable tax
attributes, and the collapsible corporation provision is aimed primarily at the
effort to convert ordinary income into a capital gain.
It is undisputed that the General Utilities doctrine has engendered complexity,
but it is doubtful that a great amount of simplification will result from its
repeal. The crucial question is whether the equitable aspects of the doctrine and
the economic benefits it can provide offset the cost of keeping complex rules
that otherwise could be eliminated. There is no simple answer to that question.
It depends in part upon the importance attached to tax law simplification and
in part upon the value attached to the doctrine. In addition, whether or not
the capital gains preference is reinstated, if the differential between capital gain
rates and ordinary income rates is relatively small, much of the complexity
surrounding General Utilities can be eliminated.' 5' Finally, in valuing simplification,
148. Lewis, A Proposal for a Corporate Level Tax on Major Tax Sales, 37 TAx NoTEs 1041,
1046 (1987); see also Wolfman, supra note 114, at 1270-72 (commenting on Lewis' proposal).
149. See Wolfman, supra note 114, at 1269-72.
150. See Wolfman, supra note 117, at 84-85. The collapsible corporation provision of the
Code is set forth in I.R.C. § 341.
151. For example, it appears that the collapsible corporation provision could be eliminated if
there is no (or even a small) preference for capital gains. See Lyons, Corporate Liquidations and
the "General Utilities Rule," 38 Sw. L.J. 1081, 1102 (1985). The collapsible corporation provision
is aimed at the use of a corporation as a device to transmute what would have been ordinary
income into a capital gain. Professor Wolfman stated in a pre-1986 article that if General Utilities
were revoked, even though capital gain preferences were retained, § 341 could be repealed because
the imposition of a double tax would at least compensate for the use of the lower capital gains
rates. Wolfman, supra note 117, at 84-85. However, if the tax law provided a substantially lower
rate for net capital gains than for ordinary income, the double tax on corporate unrealized appreciation
would not always compensate for the tax advantages available, from incorporating and selling the
target's stock.
For example, assume a 28% rate on an individual's ordinary income, and a tax rate of only
14% on net capital gains. An individual writes a book that has a $1000 value and in which he
has no basis. The individual will pay a tax of $280 if he sells the book to a publisher for its $1000
value; his after-tax income from that sale will be $720. Instead, the individual forms a corporation
and contributes his services to the corporation by authoring the book for it. The individual will
have a basis of $0 in his stock of the corporation. If the individual sells the target's stock for as
low as $837.21, he will net, after paying a tax at a rate of 14%, $720-the same amount that he
would have netted from a direct sale of the asset. If he can sell the target's stock for more than
$837.21, he will make a profit by using the corporate form. The publisher who purchases the book
will be allowed to depreciate it on a straight-line basis over the life of the copyright. Because the
copyright has a useful life of no less than 50 years, the depreciation allowance for the copyright
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it is noteworthy that in recent years neither the Treasury nor the Congress has
been deterred from proposing and passing enormously complex legislation to
deal with some perceived problem. 15 Simplicity has not been a high priority of
tax legislation.
If General Utilities is reinstated, the provisions of the pre-1987 version of
section 337 also should be readopted. 5 3 There is little benefit to requiring the
corporation to distribute its assets in liquidation so that the shareholder, who
thereby obtains a stepped-up basis in the distributed properties, could sell them
without recognizing a gain on that sale. While it is true that the corporation's
sale of its properties causes it to realize any previously unrealized appreciation,
the proceeds are held only for a transitory period in the course of the corporation's
liquidation. The justification for allowing nonrecognition in such cases is to
avoid unnecessary transactional costs that otherwise would be incurred.1
5 4
Why did Congress choose in 1986 to repudiate the General Utilities doctrine?
While it is speculation, one obvious reason was that it was a revenue raising
measure that was included in the bill when Congress needed to find additional
revenue in order to keep the TRA 1986 revenue neutral. Another reason is that
Congress feared that the availability of General Utilities increased the incentive
for corporate takeovers. 15 Congress expressed that fear even though the Treasury
found that takeover activity was not primarily influenced by tax considerations. 1
5 6
Congress mentioned other considerations,'157 but the two listed above appear to
have been the dominant reasons.
C. Application of Nonrecognition to Nonliquidating Distributions and to
Distributions of NonCapital Assets
The nonrecognition of unrealized gain should not be limited to liquidating
distributions. Concededly, the case for excluding unrealized appreciation from
will be quite small-no greater than $20 per year ($1000 X 2076). It is unlikely that the purchasing
corporation will reduce the purchase price of the target's stock much below the $1000 value of the
book. As long as the discount that the purchaser applies is less than $162, the individual could
profit from using the corporate form to transmute ordinary income into a capital gain. The collapsible
corporation provision deals with this situation. While the Commissioner could use other doctrines
to attack this transaction, the government has not always been successful in doing so. That is the
reason the collapsible corporation provision was adopted.
Since TRA 1986 eliminated the capital gains preference, at least for the present, the collapsible
corporation provision is not needed. Presumably, Congress did not repeal that provision, in part,
because it was uncertain whether the capital gain preference and the General Utilities doctrine would
reemerge in the tax law.
152. For example, consider the passive activity loss limitation provision, I.R.C. § 469 (1987),
and the various provisions that deal with the time value of money, id. §§ 1271-1275, 7872. The
recently promulgated first installment of proposed regulations for the passive activity loss and credit
limitations numbers 266 pages.
153. The pre-1987 version of § 337 granted nonrecognition of gain or loss realized on the
sale of certain assets by a corporation pursuant to a plan of liquidation that was implemented
within a twelve-month period. I.R.C. § 337 (1986).
154. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1954).
155. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1985).
156. See Tax Treatment of Hostile Takeovers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation
and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance on Hostile Takeovers, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 119-20 (1985) (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Treasury
Department).
157. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 155, at 281-82.
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corporate taxation is strongest when the corporation is being liquidated, but the
case for nonliquidating distributions is not substantially weaker. Essentially the
same considerations that point to nonrecognition for liquidating distributions
apply to current distributions of property in kind to individual shareholders.
The distributed property is no longer in corporate solution and its income stream
will be earned and receiyed in the hands of an individual. The distribution of
the asset constitutes a liquidation of the corporation's interest in that asset.
Also, if General Utilities were reinstated only for liquidating distributions, there
would be a lock-in tendency-that is, corporations would have a tax incentive
not to dispose of an asset prior to liquidation. If the doctrine is extended to
nonliquidating distributions, there will be no lock-in effect.
It is interesting that the House report on the bill that became TRA 1986 stated
that economically a liquidating distribution is indistinguishable from a nonliquidating
distribution."' The House committee concluded from that equivalence that
nonrecognition for liquidating distributions should be repudiated so that liquidating
and nonliquidating distributions would be given the same tax treatment. 159 That
decision was grounded on the conclusion that the imposition of only a single tax on
corporate distributions of appreciated property is a poor rule.l16 If one concludes that
only a single tax should be imposed, the pre-1986 treatment of nonliquidating
distributions should have been brought in line with the treatment of liquidating
distributions instead of the reverse.
If there is a significant difference between the tax rates imposed on capital
gains and those imposed on ordinary income, there is reason to prevent the use
of a corporate distribution as a means of shifting the tax characterization of
a gain from ordinary to capital. This can occur because the gain recognized on
corporate stock typically will be a capital gain regardless of the characterization
of the assets held in the corporation.' 6' One simple means of preventing that
abuse is to deny an exclusion of the corporate tax for the unrealized appreciation
of distributed assets to the extent that gain from the sale of that asset would
have been ordinary income to the corporation. However, if the tax rates on
capital gains are equal to, or only slightly lower than, the rates on ordinary
income, there is no reason to single out ordinary income assets for different
treatment.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the unrealized appreciation of distributed properties
should be insulated from an unintegrated corporate tax is a more delicately
balanced issue than most of the literature on that topic would suggest. On
balance, however, this Article concludes that General Utilities not only should
be reinstated, it should be restored to much of its original vigor.
158. Id. at 281.
159. Id. at 282.
160. Interestingly, the House committee expressed its view that the tax law should provide
relief from the double taxation imposed on corporate income. Id. at 282.
161. There are some exceptions to that general rule. For example, the collapsible corporation
provisions constitute an exception, but those provisions apply only in special circumstances. I.R.C.
§ 341 (1987).
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